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This dissertation consists of three essays that empirically address aspects of three
common questions posed in the Mexican immigration literature: What characteristics
define migrants from Mexico? How does US border-enforcement policy affect migrant
behavior? What role does foreign direct investment (FDI) into Mexico play in altering
incentives for migration to the United States?
The first essay (Chapter II) examines selection patterns of Mexican migrants
based on migration frequency. Studies of Mexican migrant selection have largely
ignored its temporary and repeated nature. In particular, the literature has not
appropriately distinguished between migrants that travel to the United States only once
and those who migrate multiple times. I model the selection process of repeat migrants in
two stages: selection into initial migration and selection into repeat migration. Allowing
for unobservable differences between non-migrants, single-episode migrants and repeat
migrants, I find negative selection of repeat migrants relative to non-migrants and no
vsignificant differences between the unobservable attributes of repeat and single-episode
migrants.
The second essay (Chapter III) addresses how border enforcement influences
migrant behavior. Increases in border enforcement during the 1990s were distributed
non-uniformly along the border, targeting regions believed to experience episodes of high
volumes of illegal border crossings. I examine how geographic and time-series variation
in annual border enforcement influences US destination choices for undocumented
Mexican migrants. While increased enforcement diverts migrants to alternative crossing
locations, I show that their final destinations tend to be robust to border enforcement.
Thus, in terms of policy, there may be benefits to coordination in enforcement efforts
across sectors.
The third essay (Chapter IV) addresses the claim that Mexico-bound FDI reduces
immigration to the United States by increasing employment opportunities and raising
Mexican wages. I use annual, state-level FDI from 1994 to 2004 to examine how FDI
flows influence US-migration propensity. FDI flows reduce the probability of migration to
the United States and increase the probability of an employment change in Mexico for non-
migrants. Further, FDI is found to increase the likelihood of employment changes for
household heads in Mexican states bordering the United States, but not the likelihood of
employment in interior states.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the last quarter century immigration to the United States, particularly Mexican
migration, has found a place at the forefront of public debate, due in part to the
magnitude ofmigration from Mexico to the United States. The US Census Bureau
estimates that in 2000, roughly 8.7 million of the 31 million foreign-born residents in the
United States reported their race or ethnicity as "Mexican." Not only do Mexican
immigrants compose a large proportion ofthe stock of foreign-born residents, they are an
equally large proportion of the flow of immigrants to the US each year. Perhaps most
striking is the flow of illegal immigrants. In 2005, the Department ofHomeland Security
reported that over one million (86 percent) of the 1.2 million illegal immigrants
apprehended along international borders of the United States were Mexican nationals.
Spurred by the significance of Mexican migration flows to the United States,
there is an ever expanding literature that examines the determinants ofMexican migration
and its effects on the US economy. This dissertation uses microdata collected in Mexico
to address aspects of three common broader questions posed in the Mexican immigration
literature: Who are the migrants from Mexico? How does US policy affect migrant
behavior? What role does the Mexican economy play in altering incentives for migration
to the United States?
The first essay (Chapter II) utilizes retrospective survey data collected in Mexico
to examine selection patterns of Mexican migrants based on migration frequency. In
2contrast to the typical view of migration as a single, permanent event, I expand on
existing selection literature by acknowledging the temporary and repeated nature of a
large proportion of Mexican migration. In particular, I employ a model of selection in
two stages to allow for differing patterns of selection between single-episode and repeat
migrants. For repeat migrants, single-stage selection models exclude information
realized on migrants' first trips; information, such as wages earned, that has the potential
to influence the decision to migrate on multiple occasions. The two-stage selection
model allows the inclusion of such information, highlighting important differences
between single-episode and repeat migrants. I find significant observable differences
between single-episode migrants and repeat migrants. Namely, higher wages realized on
the first migration increase the likelihood of repeat migration, suggesting that, insofar as
wages indicate success in migration, repeat migrants are more successful than single-
episode migrants during first migration. Most importantly, I find that repeat migrants are
negatively selected from the sample of Mexicans in the data, indicating that, on average,
non-migrants would perform better in the United States than repeat migrants.
The second essay (Chapter III) uses the same dataset along with sector-level
border patrol data to address the effects of geographic variation in border enforcement on
migrants' location choices in the United States. In response to growing concern over
widespread illegal migration from Mexico, government dramatically increased
enforcement in specific sectors along the border. The literature on border enforcement
generally finds weak effects, if any, of aggregate border enforcement in deterring illegal
migration. There is evidence, however, that migrants cross in more remote locations.
3Given the propensity for enforcement to affect migrant crossing locations, the second
paper examines whether or not enforcement has broader consequences for migrant
destination choices. I find mixed support for migrant deflection, but uncover evidence
that alludes to the existence of common migration routes.
Exploiting concerns over the general ineffectiveness of border enforcement in
deterring illegal immigration, proponents of the North American Free Trade Agreement
have argued that the increased foreign direct investment (FDI) and increased economic
opportunities in Mexico induced by the agreement would reduce the incentive for
migration to the United States. The third essay (Chapter IV), examines the effects ofFDI
in Mexico on the decision to migrate to the United States, exploiting both time-series and
geographic variation in FDI flows by Mexican state. FDI flows are found to reduce the
probability ofmigration to the US as well as influence employment ofnon-migrants. FDI
increases the likelihood of employment changes for household heads residing in border
states, but does not affect employment in interior states.
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UNOBSERVABLE ATTRIBUTES AND SELF-SELECTION
IN REPEAT MIGRATION: EVIDENCE FROM MALE
HOUSEHOLD HEADS IN MEXICO
ILL Introduction
Mexico is the single largest source country for US migrants, accounting for 27
percent of the foreign-born US population in 2000. Yet, Mexican emigration patterns are
in conflict with the assumptions of traditional models where it is more common to
assume a single and permanent move from a country of origin. Empirically, a large
proportion of Mexican migration is temporary in nature, with many migrants making
more than one trip to the US during their lifetimes. Accordingly, several studies have
examined aspects of temporary migration, such as the propensity to return to Mexico
(e.g., Ranney and Kossoudji, 1983; Massey, Alarcon, Durand & Gonzalez,1987;
Dustmann, 2003; Mesnard, 2004) and duration of stay in the US (e.g., Lindstrom, 1996;
Reyes, 1997; DaVanzo, 1983).
It remains an open question, however, whether the selection patterns of repeat
Mexican migrants differ from those who migrate from Mexico only a single time. Even
with the general documentation ofmigration patterns in the literature suggesting that
Mexican migration is more complex than would be implied by a single, permanent
migration to the US, the recent literature on migrant selection has largely consisted of
documenting where migrants fall within the human capital and earnings distributions of
home and host countries and whether one-time migrants to the US are randomly selected
from their home-country population (e.g., Borjas, 1987; Chiquiar & Hanson, 2005;
Ibarraran & Lubotsky, 2007). Thus, there is an apparent mismatch between actual
Mexican migration patterns and the migration patterns modeled in existing studies of
Mexican migrant selection.
Given the potential for migrants to learn valuable information about the US
market or acquire human capital while in the US, selection may differ substantially for
such a population. In fact, selection models that exploit a cross section of Mexican
migrants without explicitly modeling the repeating nature of a large portion of Mexican
migration may mischaracterize the selection process altogether. In this paper, I explore
previously ignored differences in selection between single-episode and repeat migrants,
allowing information realized on migrants' initial trips to the US to factor into the repeat
migration decision.
Borjas (1987) describes a theoretical model of immigrant selection with the
prediction that migrants whose home-country variance in earnings is high relative to the
US (such as those from Mexico) will be negatively selected on unobservable
characteristics such as ability or motivation. That is, after accounting for observable
attributes such as age and education, a non-migrant is predicted to have higher earnings
in the host-country than the average migrant. However, immigration in this model is
permanent in nature - agents base their migration decision on the first and second
moments of the earnings distributions in the home- and host-country and on the cost of
5
6migration. Agents do not consider either the timing of the decision to migrate or the
potential each immigrant has in choosing a particular pattern ofrepeated migration.
Immigration to the US through the mid-20th century, which consisted largely of
western European immigration, may appropriately be characterized as permanent. In
contrast, evidence suggests that a large proportion ofMexican migration is temporary.
For example, Reyes (1997) estimates that roughly 70 percent ofMexican migrants return
to Mexico within ten years of their arrival in the US. In addition, Mexican migrants may
also make several trips to the US in their lifetimes. In their study of migrants from
Western Mexico, Massey and Espinoza (1997) estimate that a 25-year-old male migrant
with one previous US trip and 10 years of labor market experience has a 32 percent
probability ofmaking an additional trip.
The importance of temporary migration in Mexican migration could reflect a
number of alternative migration decisions. For instance, a migrant who enters the US
may migrate from Mexico to the US and back several times before settling.
Alternatively, and in starker contrast to the model, a significant portion of migrants may
not settle in the US at all, but include temporary migration to the US as part of a
considered life-time strategy. The motivation for these temporary migration decisions
could be to finance the one-time purchase of durable goods, automobiles, homes, or
businesses in Mexico. Others may rely on US employment for regular income - as in the
case of agricultural workers - and adopt a transitory, seasonal pattern ofmigration in
which frequent trips are made across the border. Of course, important differences
between one-time and repeat migrants may also arise as responses to information
7acquired on migrants' earlier trips. First-time migrants enter the US with relatively less
information regarding their potential for success. On the other hand, migrants
contemplating additional trips to the US have previous experience to draw on in
formulating their migration decisions. Whether due to period-by-period learning or to
longer-term strategy, such differences in migration frequency highlight one important
dimension upon which migrants may differ.
The existing migrant selection literature ignores the potential for these differences
to affect migrant wages in the US. Indeed, studies that address migrant selection at all do
so only in the course of exploring other issues in the migration literature. Massey (1987)
uses data on migrants from four Mexican communities to determine the extent to which
undocumented migrants earn less than legal migrants. In a later study, Massey and
Donato (1993) use similar data on migrants from 13 Mexican communities in their study
of the impacts of the Immigration Reform and Control Act on Mexican migrant wages.
They estimate a log-wage equation for migrants on their most recent trip to the US. In
both of these studies, the authors find no evidence of selection bias in estimates of
migrants' wages, implying that any unobservable differences between migrants and non-
migrants in the Mexican communities studied do not affect migrant wages.
These studies, however, assume that the selection process for one-time and repeat
migrants is the same. Aside from including previous migration in the selection equation,
they make no distinction between one-time and repeat migrants. Thus, any potentially
valuable information realized on migrants' first-trips is included in the model only
indirectly through a single migration experience variable.
8Exploiting the fullest set of data available on Mexican migrants to the US, 1 allow
the selection patterns of first-time and repeat migrants to differ, modeling wages for
repeat migrants while accounting for two types of selection. The first selection stage
allows for systematic differences across migrant and non-migrant groups. The second
selection stage models migrants' decisions to engage in multiple trips to the US. This
procedure facilitates the straightforward determination of the type of repeat-migrant
selection. After allowing for differences across single-episode and repeat migrants,
repeat migrants are found to be negatively selected from the Mexican population. That
is, relative to the average non-migrant, repeat migrants are of lower ability. 1 also find
significant observable differences between single-episode migrants and repeat migrants.
Namely, higher wages realized on the first migration increase the likelihood of repeat
migration, suggesting that, insofar as wages are a measure of success in migration, repeat
migrants are more successful than single-episode migrants during first migration.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that any potential differences in the unobservable
attributes of repeat and single-episode migrants affect wages of repeat migrants.
The paper proceeds with an outline of a basic single-selection model in the
following section. After discussing the data and sample selection in Section 11.3,1
present estimates of a series of log-wage equations with a single selection stage in
Section 11.4. These estimates provide cursory evidence of a pattern ofbehavior in the
underlying data that is overlooked in previous literature (e.g., Massey, 1987; Massey &
Donato, 1993). 1 introduce the double-selection framework in Section 11.5, where
9estimates from the double-selection model are also presented with discussion. I offer
some concluding remarks in Section II.6.
11.2. Single-Selection: Empirical Framework
Existing studies of migrant selection estimate log-wage equations that include
Heckman's (1974) correction for non-random sample selection. These models
acknowledge that an individual's wage in the US is only observed ifhe has migrated to
the US, but they may be inadequate in modeling the complexities of Mexican migration.
In particular, they use a single selection equation to model the migration decision,
implicitly restricting the migration-influencing factors to be identical for all types of
migrants. It will be helpful to outline this model briefly to provide a backdrop for the
more involved model I propose later.
An individual chooses to migrate only ifthe present value ofthe expected net
benefit from migration is positive. The expected net benefit from migration depends on
expected wage differentials and costs of migration. The expected net benefit from
migration can be written in reduced form for the lh migrant as:
(1)
where Yi represents the i th migrant's expected net benefit from migration and Zi is a vector
of factors that influence the expected costs and benefits from migration. Likewise, the
migrant's log-wage can be expressed as a function of personal, occupational and
destination-specific attributes, represented by the vector, Xi:
(2)
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The Uj and ej assume a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and correlation
coefficient rho (p). Under these conditions, the migrant's expected log-wage can be
rewritten, contingent on selection into the sample, as:
where a = -yz. / cr , A(a ) = -h(yz. / cr ) / <I>(yz. / cr ), and cr is the standard error
U I U u If/ I U I U U
from the migration equation. ¢ (IJ) and <I> (0) are the pdf and cdf of the normal
distribution, respectively. The selection correction term of equation (3) can loosely be
(3)
interpreted as the probability of being in the observed sample. Wage equations that lack
this correction when sample selection is an issue are often said to be subject to a sort of
omitted variable bias.
The inclusion of the selection correction term, Ai (au)' is also convenient in the
current context of determining the type of selection on unobservable attributes. Since the
standard error of the migration equation is always positive, the estimated coefficient on
the correction term and the correlation coefficient, p, share the same sign. A positive
estimate ofthe correction coefficient indicates that the unobservable attributes that tend
to increase the likelihood that an individual becomes a migrant also tend to increase
migrant wages - positive migrant selection. Conversely, a negative estimate indicates
that individuals possessing a greater unobserved propensity for migration will tend to
have lower wages - negative migrant selection. Thus, the sign of the coefficient on the
selection correction term is ofparticular interest.
11
Identification in the log-wage model with a single selection equation requires an
exclusion restriction in the wage equation. That is, a variable that is correlated with the
individual's decision to migrate must be excluded from the wage equation. Thus, an
appropriate identifying variable is correlated with the migration decision but uncorrelated
with the individual's wages. 1
11.3. Data
Determining the nature of unobserved differences between migrants and non-
migrants (and later, unobserved differences between repeat migrants and one-time
migrants) requires data on the attributes of both groups of individuals as well as
information on the wages of migrants in the United States. The most expansive
collection of individual-level data that meets these criteria are provided by the Mexican
Migration Project (MMP), a collaboration of Princeton University and the University of
Guadalajara.2 The MMP surveys began in 1982, and have been conducted annually from
1987 through 2004. Each survey year, interviewers randomly select approximately 200
households from each of two to five Mexican communities. Though households within
communities are selected at random, the communities are located in Mexican states
whose residents have historically had high propensities for migration to the United States.
As no community is surveyed twice, the collective data represent repeated cross-sections
I Strictly speaking, the model is identified without such a restriction in the wage equation, however,
identification in the unrestricted model is arises from nonlinearities in the probit model.
2 Richter, Taylor & Yunez-Naude (2005) use data on a representative sample of rural Mexicans to examine
the effects of policy reforms on migration, but information on migrations are not as detailed as in the
MMP.
- ---------------------------
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that cover 107 communities in 19 Mexican states. The Mexican surveys are
supplemented with surveys of a non-random sample of out-migrants (i.e., migrants who
settle abroad) in the United States. The surveyors determine the destinations of US
migrants in each community and subsequently survey out-migrants in those areas.
Typically, for these US-based surveys, 20 out-migrant households are surveyed for each
Mexican community.3
The MMP survey collects demographic and economic characteristics of each
community and each household, personal migration histories for each family member in
the household, and life histories of each household head. The MMP data are particularly
useful since they contain information on both migrants and non-migrants, which
facilitates modeling the migration decision. In addition, the MMP survey collects
detailed retrospective information on the first and most recent migration episodes. In
particular, the data contain migrants' wages earned in the United States, allowing
estimation of a wage equation. The type ofmigrant selection, if any, can then be
uncovered by exploiting these two features of the data with the joint modeling of the
migrant's migration decision and subsequent US wage.
In addition to data on migrants, the MMP provides data on each community's
economic conditions (labor force participation rates, relative importance of
manufacturing and service industries, etc.) and infrastructure as well as macroeconomic
conditions in the US (national unemployment rate, cost-of-living differences).4 I
3 In a few survey years, only 10 to 15 out-migrant households were sampled. For three Mexican
communities, budgetary and time constraints prevented the execution of the out-migrant surveys.
4 The cost-of-living index is from the American Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA).
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supplement the MMP data with unemployment rates and consumer price indices from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and US-Mexico border enforcement data from the United
States Border Patrol.5
11.3.1 Sample Construction
The MMP survey collects basic information on each household-member's
migration, but detailed information on migratory trips is available only for household
heads. The empirical approach I use to determine the nature of migrant selection relies
on this detailed information so I use a subset of the MMP data that consists only of
household heads. Furthermore, even though the MMP collects general information
regarding all of each household head's migrations, detailed information is only available
for household heads' first and most recent trips to the US. As such, my sample includes
non-migrants as well as migrants who experienced their first or most recent (as of the
time the household was surveyed) migration to the US during one of the survey years. It
is therefore possible that a migrant in the sample had more than two migrations during
the survey, but only information on the first and most recent is included. Finally,
migrants who experienced their most recent US migration before 1982 (the year the
surveys began) are excluded from the sample. I also limit the sample to include male
household heads as the household heads in the data are overwhelmingly male.6
5 This is now officially the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Border Patrol.
6 Were female household heads included, they would comprise less than four percent of household heads.
Moreover, female migration has historically been driven by family migration in which women migrate
after their husbands (Donato, 1993). Results using samples including female household heads are
qualitatively similar, with female household heads are less likely to migrate than male household heads.
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11.4. Single-Selection: Estimation
Il4.1 Identification
In the following specifications, as identifying variables I exploit variation in the
annual number ofline-watch hours expended by the United States Border Patrol, number
of children, marital status, family history ofmigration, the US unemployment rate,
Mexican unemployment rate, the dollar-peso exchange rate, origin-community
characteristics, and the expected Mexican-US wage differential. As identification is
crucial to the empirical strategy outlined above, I consider in detail the suitability of these
variables as identifying variables.
Annual line-watch hours proxy for the general level ofenforcement along the US-
. Mexico border in a given year. Greater enforcement increases the expected costs of
migration, which has a direct influence on the migration choice. Line-watch hours are
possibly an attractive choice for identification, though border enforcement could affect
wages to the extent that migration deterrence affects the supply of labor in immigrant
dominated sectors. As for family history of migration, there is abundant evidence, both
anecdotal and empirical, that indicates inertia within families in terms ofmigration
propensity. To account for this family history, I include a binary variable that indicates
whether the household head's father was a US migrant. The number ofchildren and
marital status ofmigrants should also affect the decision to migrate, as either has the
potential to increase the opportunity costs (in the case where the migrant goes to the US
without his family) or explicit costs ofmigration (in the case where the whole family
migrates). Here again, abundant evidence suggests that Mexican migrants are young,
15
unmarried males. The exchange rate, Mexican unemployment rate and origin··community
characteristics - female labor force participation rate, proportion of adults with six or
more years of education, and the population of the community - are included as proxies
for economic conditions in the origin-community. These factors should theoretically
affect the opportunity cost of migration, but one might also argue that the attributes of the
origin-community may be systematically related to the attributes of its migrants. To the
extent that migrants' personal characteristics are adequately controlled for in the wage
equation, I argue that the attributes ofthe origin-community should not affect migrant
wages. The US unemployment rate, as an indicator of the health of the US economy,
should influence migrants' expected benefits from migration. Finally, existing theory of
migration predicts that migration is more likely the larger the difference between home-
and host-country wages. Thus, I also utilize the estimated wage differential for each
household head as an identifying variable. The estimated wage differential is calculated
as the difference between the log of the household head's expected US wage and the log
of his expected Mexican wage (or, equivalently, the log of the ratio of his expected US
wage to his expected Mexican wage). To derive the expected US wage, I estimated a
Mincer-style log-wage equation for all migrants and predict each household head's
expected US wage. Expected Mexican wages were derived from a similar log-wage
model for all non-migrants, using the estimated coefficients to predict expected Mexican
wages for all household heads. All wages are converted to real 2000 US dollars prior to
estimation.?
7 Specifications using nominal US dollars yielded similar results in all specifications.
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It is necessary that these identifying variables be uncorrelated with migrant
wages. This requirement may raise some concern, especially with respect to family
migration history, the US unemployment rate and the expected wage differential. I
included each of the identifying variables in the log-wage equation individually. None
was a significant determinant of migrant wages, nor were the variables jointly significant
when included all together, suggesting that excluding them from the log-wage equation is
not unreasonable.
11.4.2 Selection Equation
As outlined above, the migration decision can be modeled as a function of the
observable personal (i.e., age, education, children, marital status, occupation) and
community (i.e., female labor force participation rate, proportion of adults with six or
more years of education, population) characteristics available in the MMP data. The
migration decision is also a function of expected labor-market opportunities in the host
country and the expected cost of migration.
Of course, all identifying variables are included in the migration equation. I also
include in the migration equation factors which are likely to influence wages in the US,
such as age and years of education. In addition to these, each household head reports his
primary occupation. The skilled and agricultural worker variables are each binary
indicators that assume a value ofone if the household head's reported primary occupation
17
is classified as skilled or agricultural, respectively. 8 Finally, as an additional proxy for
the cost of migration, I include the average distance between the household head's
community and all US locations that hosted at least one migrant in the sample during the
sample period.
114.3 Log-Wage Equation
Migrants report their earnings in the US on their first and most recent trip to the
US along with the frequency with which they were paid. Using these employment data, I
calculated each migrant's real hourly US wage. In most cases, the resulting hourly wages
were reasonable, but there were several clear outliers where it was likely that either the
migrant's wages or payment frequency was incorrectly coded and was not consistent with
the migrant's reported occupation. I eliminated these 474 observations from the sample.
I explain migrant wages using the duration (in months) of the migrant's trip to the
US, the migrant's cumulative experience (in months) in the US. Migrants with more than
one trip will have had previous experience in the US and this experience is likely to be
valuable in securing employment with higher pay. I also include the migrant's age, years
of education, marital status, number of children, and legal status (whether the migrant
entered the US without documents) at the time of migration. Each migrant reports his
occupation during the migration episode and I classify these occupations as skilled or
agricultural in nature in the same manner as migrants' primary occupations. Finally,.~
8 This variable could be a function of experience gained in the US. I generated similar variables that were
based on the household head's reported occupation in the previous year. The results were similar
whether I used primary occupations or previous year's occupations to classify the household heads as
skilled/agricultural workers.
18
include the distance (in miles) that migrants travel from their home community in Mexico
to their reported US destinations.
To proxy for economic conditions in the US destination, I include the
unemployment rate and cost-of-living in the destination city. To account for changes in
cost-of-living over time, I adjust each region's cost-of-living using the Consumer Price
Index (All-Urban). In many cases, migrants' destinations coincided with established
metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Where MSA-level data was not available, I
substituted the regional unemployment rate and CPI.
II. 4. 4 Empirical Results
I first estimate a log-wage model for migrants' most-recent trips to provide a
baseline model against which to compare the results from the double selection model.
The estimates from a partial maximum likelihood and two-step estimation of the log-
wage equation for most recent trips are both shown in Table 1. As the estimates are
robust to the particular estimating procedure used, I report only the two-step estimates in
subsequent regressions, this being the less computationally intensive.
With one notable exception, the results are generally in accordance with existing
findings. Migrants whose most recent trip to the United States was longer tend to have
higher wages on their most recent trip. Additionally, migrants with more previous
experience in the US tend to have higher wages, but the marginal return to previous
experience is diminishing. More-educated migrants and migrants working in skilled
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occupations also tend to have higher wages. Agricultural workers and undocumented
migrants tend to have lower wages.9
The migration equation suggests that potential migrants are responsive to wage
differentials as theory predicts. Married household heads and household heads with more
children are less likely to migrate, while household heads whose fathers are migrants are
more likely to migrate. Migrants who work primarily in skilled occupations are less
likely to migrate. Theoretical predictions that potential migrants are responsive to
expected costs and benefits ofmigration also appear to be supported. Potential migrants
that live further from the US, and hence have a greater cost of migration, are less likely to
migrate. They are less likely to migrate in years when the Mexican unemployment rate is
lower, when the US unemployment rate is higher or when line-watch hours are higher on
the Mexico-US border. Finally, in unreported estimates indicate that older household
heads are less likely to migrate and more educated household heads are more likely to
migrate.
That migration is less likely in the face of increased border enforcement warrants
some discussion, as a potential difficulty arises in distinguishing unsuccessful migration
attempts from the deterrent effect of increased border enforcement. First, greater
enforcement increases the costs ofmigration and decreases the probability of migration
attempts. Second, greater enforcement increases the likelihood that an attempted
migration is unsuccessful. Since only successful migration attempts are observed in the
9 Migrants' legal status is self-reported. Migrants are classified as "illegal" if they have no immigration
documents or possess false documents. Problems due to misreporting legal status will likely be smaller
in the MMP surveys than in US-based surveys such as the Census since the MMP surveys are
conducted primarily in Mexico and are also retrospective.
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data, one might discount deterrence as an effect of increased border enforcement.
Abundant anecdotal evidence suggests, however, that migrants apprehended during or
following their border crossing tend to re-attempt the border crossing shortly after being
returned to Mexican territory.lO Such evidence strengthens the case for migration
deterrence as the more appropriate interpretation of the effect of increased border
enforcement.
Contrary to existing evidence, the significance of the coefficient on the selectivity
correction term (inverse Mills ratio), A, in the two-step procedure, or rho (p) in the partial
ML procedure, indicates that unobserved attributes in the migration equation also
positively influence migrant wages - positive migrant selection. This result contrasts
sharply with the evidence presented by Massey and Donato (1993) and Massey (1987). It
should be noted that the specification of the migration equation in Table 1 excludes the
variables representing previous US experience that are included in the specifications
employed in these previous studies. I exclude these variables from the current selection
equation since my goal is to more explicitly model differences between non-migrants,
one-time migrants and repeat migrants.
The result that migrants are positively selected on unobservable characteristics is
possibly due the existence of both repeat and one-time migrants in the sample, without
accounting for the learning that may occur on migrants' first trips. If greater knowledge
concerning potential for success in the US causes repeat migrants to be selected
10 See Cornelius (1978). Prior to 2004, apprehended migrants were returned to the Mexican side of the
border. In 2004, the Border Patrol implemented the Interior Repatriation Program in an effort to reduce
the probability that apprehended migrants re-attempted border crossings.
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differently than one-time migrants, then ignoring the information gained on the first trip
may confound the different types of selection. One strategy that avoids the complications
inherent in modeling the learning effect but retains the single-selection framework is
estimation of a model of first-trip wages. This model will uncover any selection prior to
the start of migration, but cannot account for systematic differences between migrants
that are due to pre-meditated strategies.
The selection equation remains the same in first-trip wage model, but there is a
restriction placed on the log-wage equation. Namely, the effect of previous US
experience on log-wages is restricted to be zero, since first-time migrants have no
previous US experience by definition. The estimates using first trips only are presented
in Table 2. Of note in columns (1) and (2) is that there appears to be no selection on
unobservable characteristics in first trips. Rho is not significant for either the partial ML
or two-step estimation. Out of concern that I had retained some wages that resulted from
incorrect coding ofpayment frequency, I excluded those migrants whose log-wages were
outside of the inner-quartile range of$4.89 to $7.69 per hour. The results when these
migrants are excluded are shown in columns (3) and (4). The estimates of rho (P) suggest
that for first-time migrants, there is negative correlation between errors in the selection
equation and errors in the log-wage equation. This result implies that there is negative
selection of migrants based on unobservable characteristics, though the partial ML
estimate is only significant at the 10 percent level. Allowing the unexplained component
of wages to be interpreted as ability or motivation, the negative correlation suggests that
those migrants with lower ability are also those with greater unobserved propensity to
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migrate. l ! Put simply, migrants tend to be of lower ability than non-migrants. The reader
should note that these results must be interpreted with some caution as the significance of
p is sensitive to the exclusion of the outer-quartiles of wage earners.
11.5. Double-Selection: Empirical Framework
As discussed previously, a model of migrant wages (either on the migrant's first
trip or most recent trip) with a single selection stage disregards the distinction between
first-time and repeat migrants. 12 If migrants are non-randomly selected from the
population of Mexicans then one must also acknowledge the possibility that repeat
migrants are non-randomly selected from the population of migrants. For instance, if
migrants differ with respect to pre-meditated strategies, a singular treatment of first-time
migrants and migrants who choose multiple trips may be inappropriate, even in a
specification of first-trip wages. Furthermore, migrants may differ with respect to the
type of information they receive concerning their potential for success in the US during
their first trip. The possibility for such differences in learning suggests that the model of
selection described above is perhaps too restrictive, as individuals with prior US trips and
individuals with no prior migration experience are treated the same with respect to the
factors that predict migration. That is, the restrictive model excludes from the selection
equation potentially important information on earnings and occupation type during
11 The unexplained component of wages could arise from unobserved differences other than ability such as
specific skills, quality of education, opportunities available in Mexico, etc.
12 The distinction between one-time and repeat migrants has significance beyond concern for proper
econometric modeling. In addition to the amount of time they stay in the US, one-time and repeat
migrants are likely to differ in their impact on the US economy.
-------------------
23
migrants' first trips. A more appropriate characterization of the selection process of
repeat migrants should allow for the possibility that the re-migration decision is
influenced by information realized during previous trips to the US. Accounting for both
the selection into migration and the selection into subsequent migration will expose any
systematic differences between the unobservable characteristics of first-time and repeat
migrants. I next consider a log-wage equation for repeat migrants' most recent trips with
multiple-selection, as outlined in Tunali (1986).
The wage of a repeat migrant on his most recent trip is only observed ifhe has
first selected into migration, then selected into repeat migration, conditional on
information learned during his first migration. As before, a household head chooses to
migrate only if the present value of the expected net benefit from migration is positive.
The expected net benefit from first migration and from most recent migration depends on
expected wage differentials and costs of migration. The expected net benefit from first
migration and its analog for most recent migration can be written in reduced form for the
lh migrant as:
(4)
(5)
where the y's represent the lh migrant's expected net benefit from first and most recent
migration, respectively. The attributes that influence the decision to migrate for the first
time are represented by x Ii, while X2i represents factors that influence the decision to
migrate more than once. Thus, X2i should include information realized on the initial
migration to the US.
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A first migration is only observed when Yli ~ O. Likewise, a repeat migration is
only observed whenY2i ~ O. Therefore, the ith migrant's log-wage is given by
If repeat-migrant wages are observed for the entire population, the disturbances in
equations (4), (5), and (6) are assumed to be distributed multivariate normal with zero
means. The variances and covariances of these disturbances are
(6)
Of course, this wage is only observed for repeat migrants, and the existence of possible
selection implies that the mean of the disturbance in the log-wage equation is not
necessarily zero. Specifically,
(7)
where AI' = j(a.)F(B.) / G(a.,b.,p) and A2, = j(b.)F(A.) / G(a"b"p) are the selectivityI I I 1 I I I I I I
Bi = (bi - pa)/~(l- p)2 ,j() is the univariate standard normal density function, F() is
the univariate standard normal distribution function, and G() is the bivariate standard
normal distribution function. The repeat migrant's expected wage can then be expressed
as
(8)
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The selectivity correction variables are calculated using consistently estimated
parameters from a first stage bivariate probit model with partial observability - a probit
with selection. They are then included in the log-wage equation as explanatory variables.
As discussed in detail in Tunali (1986), an additional restriction on the selection
equations is required for identification of the model. In particular, at least one of the
identifying variables from the first selection equation must be excluded from the second
selection equation. Thus, an appropriate excluded variable would be correlated with the
decision to migrate for the first time, but uncorrelated with the decision to re-migrate. In
the double-selection model, I exclude the US unemployment rate from the second
migration equation. To see an intuitive justification for this restriction, consider the
differences in the uncertainty that individuals face with respect to employment based on
possessing previous migration experience. Those who have migrated previously may
have specific knowledge of employment opportunities and as such, the US
unemployment rate may hold relatively little significance in influencing the migration
decision. Conversely, first-time migrants will tend to have relatively less infonnation
regarding specific employment so that general measures of unemployment may factor
into the decision to migrate. As further justification, tests revealed that the US
unemployment rate is a significant factor in the decision to become a migrant, but is not a
predictor of repeat migration.
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Il.5.1 Estimation
In the double-selection framework, the migration selection equation remains the
same as in the single-selection approach. As this selection equation uncovers the
differences between migrants and non-migrants, the variables used to describe these
differences must be observed for both migrants and non-migrants. The second selection
equation - the repeat migration equation - contains several variables that are observed
only for migrants, namely the wage realized on the migrant's first US trip, the duration of
the first trip and indicators for the type of work performed on the first trip (e.g., skilled or
agricultural work). As discussed above, the repeat migration equation excludes the US
unemployment rate for identification purposes.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show estimates from the first-stage ofthe double-
selection model in which variables realized on migrants' first US trips (wage, duration,
and occupation-type) are excluded from repeat-migration selection equation. This model
contrasts with the estimates of the preferred model in columns (3) and (4), in which first-
trip experiences are included in the repeat-migration equation. I also exclude migrants'
primary occupation types from the repeat-migration equation in favor of including
occupation types from the first trip, as first-trip occupations are better predictors of repeat
migration than primary occupation types.
The results from the preferred first-stage procedure are shown in Table 3 in
columns (3) and (4). Focusing on the repeat-migration equation estimates in column (3),
estimated coefficients imply that migrants who earn more on their first trips are more
likely to migrate again. Migrants who worked in skilled occupations during their first
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trip are less likely to be repeat migrants. In contrast, migrants who work in agriculture
are more likely to migrate multiple times. Given the seasonality of agricultural work, this
tendency is not surprising. Interestingly, the differential between migrants' expected
wages in Mexico and expected wages in the United States has a negative effect on the
probability of observing a repeat migration. Additionally, the correlation between the
errors in the migration and repeat-migration equations is insignificant, implying that the
unobserved propensity to migrate for the first time is not related to the unobserved
propensity to be a repeat migrant. 13
Turning now to the log-wage equation estimates for repeat migrants, the
implications are largely similar to those in the single-selection framework. Table 4
shows results from three different models. The first is a naIve model of repeat-migrant
wages shown in column (1), included here simply as a basis for comparison. The second
column show results from a single-selection model of repeat migrant wages, the selection
stage modeling the selection into migration. Finally, the model that accounts for both
selection stages - selection into migration and selection into repeat migration - is shown
in column (3) of Table 4. The positive and significant coefficient on first-trip wages
supports the hypothesis that positive selection in the single-selection log-wage approach
is driven at least partially by the positive correlation of first-trip wages with both the
decision to migrate on multiple occasions as well as wages on migrants' most recent trips
to the US. In addition, undocumented migrants and agricultural workers tend to earn less
13 There is significant heterogeneity in the number ofprevious trips experienced by repeat migrants, with
some migrants in the sample reporting more than 40 trips to the US in their lifetimes. To verify that
such outliers were not driving the results, I excluded repeat migrants who were in the top quartile ofUS
trips (those with more than 8 trips to the US). Both the first-stage and log-wage estimates were
qualitatively similar when this group of repeat migrants was excluded.
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during their most recent tripS.14 Most importantly, the coefficient estimate for the first
selectivity correction terms suggests that the single-selection approach to estimating log-
wages may be misleading. In particular, the estimates suggest negative selection into
migration based on unobservable characteristics, but no selection on unobservable
attributes for repeat migrants compared to single-time migrants. That is, insofar as the
unobservable component of wages can be interpreted as ability, as a general sub-
population of survey respondents, repeat migrants are toward the lower end of the
unobserved ability distribution.
The selection results indicate that there are systematic unobservable differences
between migrants based on migration frequency. This analysis, of course, does not speak
explicitly to differences in selection based on permanency ofmigration. In particular,
the double-selection framework in its current incarnation cannot uncover unobserved
differences between repeat migrants that maintain a household in Mexico and repeat
migrants that eventually settle in the US. Likewise, it cannot distinguish one-time
migrants who return to Mexico and one-time migrants who remain in the US indefinitely.
Thus, the result that repeat-migrants are negatively selected on unobserved ability cannot
be interpreted as a direct verification of the theoretical predictions ofpermanent
migration described by BOljas (1987), though it is not inconsistent with the theory.
14 Given the seasonality of agricultural work, the rather parsimonious treatment of agricultural workers
employed here could be viewed as overly restrictive. In particular, the effect ofprevious US experience
on wages could be expected to differ significantly between agricultural and non-agricultural workers.
Estimates were robust to more flexible wage specifications wherein the effect of previous US
experience was allowed to differ by occupation-type.
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11.6. Conclusion
Migration is most typically modeled in the literature as a permanent, single event.
While this type of model is appropriate for many migrants, it may not be appropriate for a
significant proportion of migrants to the US. Temporary trips and repeated trips to the
US are both key characteristics of Mexican migration; characteristics overlooked by
traditional models ofmigration. Likewise, empirical studies of selection based on
unobservable characteristics also fail to acknowledge the variation in Mexican migration
patterns, opting instead for simpler models of migrant selection. These studies have·
found that migrants are not selected based on unobservable attributes. I attempt to
uncover differences between migrants on one dimension, namely, migration frequency.
To account for differences between one-time and repeat migrants, I estimate a Heckman-
style double-selection model of migrant wages. The estimates from this model indicate
significant observable differences between repeat and single-episode migrants in that
higher first-trip wages increase the likelihood of repeat migration. Additionally, I find
that repeat migrants are negatively selected on unobservable attributes relative to non-
migrants. They also indicate that any unobservable differences between repeat and
single-time migrants do not significantly affect migrant wages. Interpreting the
unexplained portion of migrant wages as migrant ability, these findings suggest that
repeat migrants are of lower ability than non-migrants and that there is no significant
difference in ability between repeat and single-episode migrants. This highlights the
shortcomings of single-selection specifications in modeling Mexican migration. It also
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suggests that one may draw misleading conclusions regarding Mexican migrant selection
from models that ignore differences in Mexican migration patterns.
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CHAPTER III
BORDER ENFORCEMENT AND MIGRANT DIVERSION
111.1. Introduction
In the last quarter century immigration to the United States, particularly Mexican
migration, has found a place at the forefront of public debate. The U.S. Census Bureau
estimates that in 2000, there were over 31 million foreign-born residents in the United
States. Of these, roughly 8.7 million reported their race or ethnicity as "Mexican." Not
only do Mexican immigrants compose a large proportion of the stock of foreign-born
residents, they are an equally large proportion of the flow of immigrants to the US each
year. In 2005, the Department of Rome1and Security (DRS) estimated that of the 1.1
million immigrants admitted to the United States, over 160,000 were born in Mexico.
For 21 of 50 states, the inflow of Mexican-born immigrants was larger than that from any
other country. Even more striking is the flow of illegal immigrants based on data from
border apprehensions. 15 In 2005, the DRS reported that over one million (86 percent) of
the 1.2 million illegal immigrants apprehended along international borders of the United
States were Mexican nationals.
The large flows of undocumented Mexican migrants to US-border states
prompted the introduction of initiatives in three of the nine US Border Patrol sectors
15 While annual border apprehensions are not a completely accurate measure of illegal immigration flows,
they do provide a rough indication of the magnitude of illegal immigration relative to legal immigration.
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along the US-Mexico border. These initiatives targeted the most highly trafficked
sections of the border and both increased the number ofborder agents and provided more
sophisticated technology for detecting and apprehending undocumented migrants within
their sectors. The first, Operation Blockade was a two-week long initiative launched in
1993 in El Paso (Texas) Sector which was replaced in 1994 by the longer-term Operation
Hold the Line. Also in 1994, a third initiative, Operation Gatekeeper was formally
established in San Diego (California) Sector. Later, McAllen (Texas) Sector
implemented Operation Rio Grande in 1997, which was followed most recently by
Tucson (Arizona) Sector's Operation Safeguard in 1999. In this paper, I examine the
impact that these initiatives have on Mexican migrants' ultimate destination choices in
the US through a more general analysis of the effects of geographic variation in border
enforcement.
Models ofmigration based on the human capital investment model predict that
migration is less likely in response to greater expected costs ofmigration. The increased
probability of apprehension can affect the expected costs ofmigration in several ways.
First, it may increase the probability that migrants employ the services of a human
smuggler ("coyote"), holding constant the price of coyotes. Second, more stringent
border enforcement likely increases the costs of smuggling to coyotes. Thus, the
expected price of a coyote is higher, holding constant the probability of employing a
coyote. Finally, greater enforcement may increase a migrant's expected number of
unaided crossing attempts. There are numerous studies that investigate the effect of
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border protection on Mexicans' decision to migrate. 16 The simplest analyses employ
dummy variables that indicate the implementation of government policies designed to
increase border protection, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, for
example. Alternative analyses utilize aggregated data on annual line-watch hours (man
hours expended on border monitoring) for the entire US-Mexico border, which ignores
the significant variation in enforcement levels over the 2,000 mile-long border. 17 These
studies find weak evidence, if any, that border enforcement deters illegal immigration.
In light of the apparent weak deterrent effects ofborder enforcement, some recent
studies have highlighted the possible diversionary effects ofborder enforcement. That is,
they explore the phenomenon of migrants choosing alternative US-entry routes in
response to geographically concentrated increases in border enforcement. Gathmann
(2004) studies enforcement effects in the market for migrant smugglers. She provides
evidence that increases in aggregate border enforcement during the mid-1990s caused
illegal migrants to shift from traditional crossing routes to more remote, and hence
dangerous, crossing routes.
More relevant to the current analysis, Sorensen and Carrion-Flores (2007) discuss
the effects of sector-level border enforcement on migrants' crossing location choices.
They use data from Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) that track both time-series and
geographic variation in border protection. This richer dataset enables analysis of the
16 See for example, Donato, Durand and Massey (1992), Koussoudji (1992), Espenshade (1994), RanS0n
and Spilimbergo (1999), and Guzman, Raslag and Orrenius (2002).
17 An exception is Ranson, Robertson and Spilimbergo (2002) which explores the relationship between
sector-level border enforcement and wages in border communities in Southern California and west
Texas. Migrant diversion, however, is not the focus of the paper.
34
diversionary effects of non-uniform border enforcement across border patrol sectors.
Using a modified nested logit framework, the authors decompose the effect of
enforcement into a deterrence effect, wherein migrants choose not to migrate, and a
diversion effect, where illegal immigrants simply choose to cross the border in a different
sector. Both types of effects are significant, indicating that targeted enforcement is
successful in deterring some migration, but does divert some migrants to alternative
crossing locations in different border sectors.
The true implications ofmigrant diversion for US communities, however, depend
on whether the estimated diversionary effects of enforcement on crossing location
ultimately influence migrants' destination choices. This issue is not addressed by
Sorensen and Carrion-Flores (2007) as the nested logit framework used does not identify
the specific effects of enforcement in a given sector on the probability of choosing a
specific crossing alternative. For example, the authors are unable to address whether
increased enforcement in San Diego diverts migrants to the adjacent El Centro sector, or
whether migrants are diverted to McAllen sector, along the southernmost tip of Texas.
The way in which migrants are diverted may have consequences for the geographic
distribution of illegal immigrants in the United States. If migrants are diverted to
adjacent sectors, the ultimate destination choices may be unaffected. If, however,
migrants choose more distant crossing alternatives, enforcement in California may
influence the flow of illegal immigrants to Texas. Given the well-documented influence
of enclaves and familial ties on destination choice, even diversion to distant border
crossings may not ultimately affect migrants' destinations within the US. As such, this
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paper seeks to identify patterns in the effect of targeted enforcement not on crossing
choices, but on migrant destination choices. I find evidence in support ofmigrant
diversion in crossing location in response to variation in border enforcement. Results
indicate that diversion appears to have a relatively small effect on migrants' ultimate
destination choices, however, and that there is a strong degree ofpersistence in
destination choice.
In the following section I examine the historical variation in border enforcement,
showing the effects of the border initiatives on line-watch hours. In Section 111.3, I
briefly discuss the theoretical model. Section IlIA describes the data and sample used to
model migrants' location choices. Section 111.5 discusses the probit models of destination
choice, motivates the need for the nested logit models of migrants' joint crossing-
destination choices, and reviews the results from the nested logit specifications. Section
111.6 concludes.
111.2. Graphical Evidence
Border enforcement, measured in line-watch hours, did not vary much from the
late 1970s through the early 1980s. With the exception of a slight, temporary increase in
line-watch hours following the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, significant
increases in border enforcement did not begin until the mid-1990s (see Figure 1).
Figure 2 shows the disaggregated border enforcement data by sector. San Diego
sector has consistently contributed the majority of total line-watch hours and was the first
to experience a large increase in line-watch hours, followed shortly after by more modest
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increases in enforcement in EI Paso sector. The increase in line-watch hours in Tucson
sector and McAllen sector in the late 1990s follows from the implementation of
Operations Safeguard and Rio Grande, respectively.
Figure 3 shows border enforcement per border-mile when sectors are grouped
together according to coincidence with border state lines. San Diego and EI Centro
sectors are responsible for patrolling the California border and Yuma and Tucson sectors
monitor the Arizona border. I associate EI Paso, Marfa, Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen
sectors with Texas. The increase in hours per mile along the California border beginning
in 1994 is driven primarily by San Diego sector. The increase a few years later in Texas
is due to primarily to increases in EI Paso, Laredo and McAllen sectors. Finally, the
increase in line-watch hours per mile along the Arizona border are driven mostly by
Tucson Sector's Operation Safeguard, though there were modest increases in line-watch
hours in Yuma Sector in the late 1990s.
III.3. Empirical Framework
Geographic variation in border protection has potentially significant implications
for the geographic distribution ofMexican migrants in the United States. The relative
concentrations of Mexican migrants in various US regions can be viewed as the
culmination of individual migrants' decisions to choose one destination over another.
The empirical strategy, therefore, will involve estimation of a discrete choice, typically
derived from a random utility model (RUM). Consider a random utility model broadly
defined in the migration context, in which each ofN potential migrants chooses from
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among US destination alternatives,} = 1, .. J, based on the utility, Unj, he receives from
each alternative. The probability that individual n chooses alternative} is then given by:
P"j =P(Unj > Uni , V} "::F i). (9)
In the current context, utility at each destination will be a function of the destination's
characteristics, Dj . These characteristics include the costs ofmigration and expected
benefits to be accrued at each destination. Utility is also a function ofpersonal attributes,
Xn, such as age, education, and occupation-type, etc. Making the typical assumption that
utility is linear in these characteristics, the utility of alternative} is given by
(10)
where a and fJ are parameters to be estimated and eij is the error term.
Typically, the cost of migrating to a destination is approximated using the
distance between origin and destination. As border protection also likely influences the
cost ofmigration to each alternative, it should be included along with the other
alternative-specific attributes. In practice, the way in which border protection is
incorporated in the model will depend on how the migrant's choice set is ultimately
specified, as will be discussed below.
111.4. Data
To uncover any potential diversion effects of non-uniform border protection I use
data provided by the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), a collaborative effort of
Princeton University and the University of Guadalajara. The MMP surveys began in
1982, and have been conducted annually from 1987 through 2004. Each survey year,
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interviewers randomly select approximately 200 households from each of two to five
Mexican communities. Though households within communities are selected at random,
the communities are located in Mexican states whose residents have historically had high
propensities for migration to the United States. As no community is surveyed twice, the
data are repeated cross-sections that cover 107 communities in 19 Mexican states. The
survey collects demographic and economic characteristics of each community and each
household, personal migration histories for each family member in the household, and
life histories of each household head. Included in these life histories is a yearly account
of each household head's migrations. I restrict the sample to include only trips for iilegal
migrants as border enforcement should not directly influence the cost of migration for
legal migrants. Finally, due to data limitations, I consider only migrant trips made from
1982 to 2000.
The MMP data do not contain information on the household head's residential
location for all migratory trips to the US, but a reasonable proxy for the household head's
residence, the state and city in which the household head is employed, is included. 18 As
outlined in the discussion of the empirical model, determinants ofmigrants , location
choices can be grouped into destination attributes, migrant characteristics and border
enforcement variables. Destination attributes include unemployment rate, real cost of
living, real per capita income, and distance from migrants' home communities in
18 Any concerns over this minor shortcoming of the data are mitigated in the current analysis as we are
simply concerned with the state of residence. The lack of residential information will only be a problem
if migrants' residential and occupational locations in the US are separated by state lines.
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Mexico. 19 Individual-level variables are age, years of education, characteristics of the
migrant's primary occupation, personal migration experience, and the migration
experience of each migrant's home community in each destination choice. These last
three variables warrant some discussion.
Each migrant reports his primary occupation in the MMP survey. The two
characteristics of the migrant's primary occupation are dummy variables indicating
whether or not the occupation is skilled and whether or not the occupation is in the
agricultural sector, respectively. There are two personal migration experience variables.
The first, PME, is a dummy variable that takes a value of unity if the migrant has
previously migrated to the destination region. The second personal migration experience
variable, PMmonths, is the cumulative number ofmonths the migrant has spent in the
destination region prior to the current migration. The community migration experience
variable for a migrant is the proportion of total number of months spent in the US that
were spent in the destination region, summed across all community members surveyed up
to the year preceding the migrant's trip. This is the same variable constructed by Bauer,
Epstein, and Gang (2006) and is designed to capture differences in available networks
across US destinations. It also may account for some community-specific heterogeneity
in destination choice. This measure should have a positive effect on the probability of
choosing a given destination.
The concept ofborder enforcement in a given sector can be loosely defined as
some function of line-watch hours in that sector. Before proceeding to the empirical
19 The variables are available at the MSA-Ievel. I have averaged the values across all MSAs within each
state to arrive at the state-level variables.
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model of migrants , responses to geographically non-uniform border enforcement, it will
be helpful to first consider what information might influence migrants' destination
choices and, more generally, what information migrants may have regarding border
enforcement. I will make the simplifying assumption that migrants do not respond t?
future levels of border enforcement.2o Therefore, each of the border-enforcement
measures considered will utilize current-year or historical line-watch hours.
Additionally, line-watch hours alone may not be a fully appropriate measure of
enforcement in each region since the different border offices are responsible for
patrolling stretches of the border whose lengths vary widely by state. To account for
differences in such responsibility, I use line-watch hours per border-mile as the basic
measure ofborder enforcement. Admittedly, measures of enforcement based on line-
watch hours will not capture increases in border enforcement due to technological
developments (thermal imaging, night-vision equipment, seismic sensors, radios etc.), but
line-watch hours (border patrol agents) are typically the largest budgetary component of
border enforcement.
Initially, I consider annual hours per border-mile in the year of migration as a
proxy for expected border enforcement. Ofcourse, it is possible that there are delays in
the transmission of information from previous migrants to potential migrants regarding
levels ofborder enforcement and success of crossing in various locations. As such, I also
consider annual line-watch hours per mile in the year previous to migration as a proxy for
20 This assumption is more troubling in the context of the migration choice than the destination choice. In
terms of destination choices, this assumption is troubling if intertemporal substitution between
destinations is a characteristic of migrant decision-making. Allowing for such substitution would
suggest that migrants both predict future enforcement levels and make multiple migrations to the US.
As a fIrst pass, then, I do not view dismissing future enforcement as overly restrictive.
41
expected border enforcement. In all specifications, the logarithm ofline-watch hours per
border-mile is used as the border enforcement measure.
Of course, the endogeneity of border enforcement is a concern in modeling many
aspects ofmigration decisions, including destination choice. Typically an issue with
aggregated migration data, border enforcement is likely a function of the expected
number of illegal immigrants. This may present a challenge in the current case as the
expected number of illegal immigrants is likely based on past illegal immigration (and
hence, the decisions of previous migrants) and current migrants tend to follow previous
migrants (based on community or personal migration experience). Thus, the border
enforcement variable may be correlated with the unobserved portion of utility since
border enforcement and the current migration decision are both likely influenced by
previous migration decisions. The migration experience variables will mitigate this
problem. Nevertheless, I treat border enforcement as an endogenous variable as factors
unobserved by the researcher may cause some degree of correlation between border
enforcement and the error term to remain.
The simplest solution to the endogeneity of enforcement is to use lagged values of
border enforcement. Alternatively, existing studies have dealt with the endogeneity of
border enforcement in several different ways.2l Most notably, Sorensen and Carrion-
21 Hanson, Robertson and Spilimbergo (2002) model border enforcement as a function of several variables
exhibiting only time-series variation. Gathmann (2004) instruments for border enforcement using the
drug budget of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), arguing that illegal immigration and drug-
trafficking are typically separate enterprises and that the budget of the DEA is correlated with the
budget of the border patrol. Since my aim is to exploit geographic and time-series variation in
enforcement, I require instruments that exhibit both geographic and time-series variation. Thus, the
instrumental variables approaches employed by Hanson, Robertson and Spilimbergo (2002) and
Gathmann (2004) are inadequate in the current context.
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Flores (2007) instrument for sector-level border enforcement using two political process
variables, arguing that local politicians influence the level of enforcement in sectors
proximate to their districts. For each border sector, they first ascertain the size of the
Congressional delegation representing the border sector, counting how many
Congressional districts share the sector's border with Mexico. The authors assert that the
budget and level of enforcement in a sector should increase as the size ofthe sector's
lobby in Congress grows. Second, they argue that the strength of the state Congressional
delegation representing a border patrol sector should affect the level of funding and
enforcement in that sector. They count how many members from the each border state's
delegation are on the House Appropriations committee and then match those state
delegations to border patrol sectors. Sorensen and Carrion-Flores (2007) construct these
data using the Congressional Quarterly Almanac.22
One drawback to using this instrumental variables strategy is that it requires
somewhat unfamiliar methods for inclusion within discrete choice models. Furthermore,
results are qualitatively similar when either this more complex IV strategy or lagged
values of enforcement are utilized in dealing with endogeneity. As such, I favor the
treatment that employs lagged values ofline-watch hours to correct for the endogeneity
of border enforcement.23
22 I constructed similar data using various editions each of Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America
and the Congressional Staff Directory.
23 The control function approach is described in Petrin and Train (2003) and implemented in Sorensen and
Carrion-Flores (2007). Results using this approach are available from the author upon request.
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111.5. Empirical Results
III. 5.1. Probit Specifications
While patterns of migration from Mexico to the US are admittedly complex and
varied, the probit model offers perhaps the simplest framework within which one might
reasonably analyze enforcement effects on migrant location choice. Given California's
role as the most common destination for Mexican migrants and the overwhelming
increase in line-watch hours per mile that occurred following Operation Gatekeeper, I
offer as a preliminary analysis a consideration of border enforcement's role in affecting
migrant choices to go to California versus elsewhere in the US. Table 5 shows the results
from probit model specifications that include several variations of enforcement measures
that differ by degree ofdisaggregation. A model lacking border enforcement is shown in
column (1) for comparison purposes. The effects of variables in this model are largely
robust to the inclusion of enforcement variables. Migration experience plays a significant
role, with migrants tending to choose California if they have previously been to
California. The effect of experience is also significant with respect to the length of time
spent in California, where migrants are more likely to choose California the greater the
number of months spent in California previously. Community migration experience
plays a similar role as estimates indicate that migrants tend to follow those in their
communities who have migrated in the past. Finally, migrants whose home communities
are farther from the Texas border are more likely to choose California. This may be
evidence of destination substitution, as it suggests that choosing California is more likely
for migrants for whom it is more costly to migrant to an alternative state. The model in
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column (2) includes total annual line-watch hours. The negative and significant
coefficient on this variable indicates that as enforcement along the entire border
increases, the likelihood of migrants choosing California as a destination decreases.
Since variation in California border enforcement is responsible for much of the variation
in total border enforcement for a large part of the sample period, such a finding may be
evidence of migrant diversion.
To more explicitly uncover a diversion effect, I consider a specification that
distinguishes California border enforcement from enforcement along the remainder of the
border in column (3). If migrant diversion were taking place and if migrants consider the
level of line-watch hours in making location choice, we should expect a negative
coefficient on enforcement in California and a positive coefficient on non-California
enforcement. The estimate of the coefficient on California border enforcement, though
negative, is insignificant. Additionally, the negative estimate of the effect of enforcement
in border regions other than California is inconsistent with the diversion hypothesis as it
implies migration to California is less likely when enforcement is greater in non-
California sectors.
Of course, employing an aggregated measure of enforcement along other sections
of the border constrains the effect of enforcement in sectors proximate to California and
the effect of enforcement in more distant sectors to be equal. This shortcoming is
addressed in the specification shown in column (4), in which enforcement is
disaggregated by border state. This model has the greatest log-likelihood of the probit
specifications, though none of the enforcement variables are individually statistically
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significant. A likelihood ratio test oftheir joint significance rejects the null hypothesis
that the joint effect on the probability of choosing California is zero.24 One explanation
for this is the high degree of correlation between the enforcement variables - each pairing
of enforcement variables generates a correlation coefficient greater than 0.9.
While the probit analysis is attractive for its simplicity, it does not take full
advantage of the richness in the data and limits the researcher's ability to examine any
potential complexity in migrants' destination substitution patterns. In particular,
aggregating all destination alternatives other than California into a single entity obscures
any diversion effects that may take place between destinations that comprise the
aggregate. In the next section, I discuss more flexible models of destination that will
facilitate the analysis of such diversion.
III 5. 2. Polytomous Choice Specifications
Extending the probit model to a polytomous choice model ofdestination choice
(i.e., a model in which migrants choose from among different destination states) presents
complications in integrating border enforcement into any of several variants one might
consider. First consider a model in which border enforcement along each state's border
is interpreted as a characteristic of that state. While this model is attractive because
utility is specified as a function of enforcement in only one border region, it has the
significant drawback ofleaving interior states with no convenient border-sector pairing.
These interior states would presumably require elimination from the analysis.
24 The X 2 statistic is 10.04, which is greater than the critical value of 7.81 at the 95 percent confidence
level with three degrees of freedom.
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Alternatively, utility can be specified as a function of border enforcement along
each border region. This approach has its complications, as well. While the conditional
logit yields estimates of the effect of characteristics that vary across choices such as
distance, unemployment rates, or cost-of-living, the state-level border enforcement
variables used in the probit specifications do not vary across destination choices. Thus,
without special treatment, these enforcement terms drop out of the familiar logit
probability equation. Regressors that are constant across destination alternatives, such as
border enforcement, must be included as an interaction with alternative specific dummy
variables. This modification allows the coefficient on the border enforcement terms to
vary across choices rather than enforcement itself varying across choices. As with
standard dummy variables, one of the attribute-destination interactions for each
individual-level attribute must be dropped to avoid singularity. The resulting coefficients
are then interpreted relative to the dropped interaction. Thus, the relative interpretation
of the coefficients precludes the calculation of any absolute marginal effects or
elasticities with respect to the enforcement variables. Such effects are necessary to
determine whether the statistically significant effect of enforcement has any practical
import in affecting migrants' destination choices.
I ultimately favor an alternative approach which expands the migrant's choice set,
so that migrants choose from among joint crossing-destination pairs. In this way, each
alternative has an associated level of border enforcement and enforcement varies across
alternatives, obviating the need to create the interactions required in the model of simple
destination choices.
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I simplify the conditionallogit analysis so that both destination and crossing
locations are defined at the state level. That is, the crossing location component for each
crossing-destination alternative is defined as California border crossing, Arizona border
crossing or Texas border crossing. The destination component consists of one the states
on the US-Mexico border (California, Arizona, and Texas) or an alternative choice
consisting of all the "interior" states of the Union, resulting in four possible destination
components,zs Aggregation of all interior states is not overly restrictive in that, once a
migrant chooses an interior state, his particular state of residence is not likely influenced
by the level of border protection as the border has already been crossed. Combining
these three crossing locations and four destinations yields 12 unique alternatives from
which migrants may choose. Two of the possible crossing-destination pairs (California-
Arizona and Arizona-Texas) were eliminated because they were chosen too infrequently,
leaving ten possible alternatives in the estimation.
1115.3. Nested Logit Specifications
A key assumption of the conditionallogit model is that the random components of
alternative-specific utility are uncorrelated across alternatives. This assumption imposes
patterns of substitution between alternatives in which the elimination of an alternative
25 New Mexico shares about 150 miles of its border with Mexico but has been included as an interior state.
The border area ofNew Mexico is rugged and remote, making it difficult to cross into the United States
there. This may suggest that its characterization as a border state, while technically correct, may not
necessarily be appropriate, and that it could reasonably be treated as an interior state. Though
conditionallogit estimates tend to show sensitivity to the specification of the choice set in many
applications, unreported results show that estimates in this context are robust to the separation ofNew
Mexico from other interior states. For considerations ofparsimony, then, I consider only models that
group New Mexico with interior states.
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increases the probability of choosing remaining alternatives proportionately so that the
ratio ofthe probabilities of choosing any two existing alternatives remains the same.
Such an imposition is particularly unrealistic for modeling the migrant's crossing-
destination decision. For example, suppose that the alternative that includes an El Centro
crossing and California destination is eliminated. The assumption of the standard
conditionallogit model suggests that the probabilities of choosing all other crossing-
destination alternatives increase proportionally, even for those alternatives that neither
include California as a destination nor include crossing sectors adjacent to El Centro. A
Hausman test rejects the validity of the IIA assumption with a %2(10) statistic of 43.28 at
the 99 percent significance level when the alternative consisting of California crossing
and California destination is excluded from the choice set. The empirical strategy, then,
must not depend on the IIA assumption. Perhaps the most commonly used procedure that
relaxes the IIA assumption is the nested logit. As the literature on the nested logit model
is extensive, I forego a full technical discussion and note simply that while the IIA
assumption is relaxed across nests, it is retained within nests.
Using the nested logit in the current context, we may think: ofthe choice process
in one of two logically appealing ways. The first possible nesting structure models first
the choice of crossing location, after which migrants choose a destination. Alternatively,
we may specify a nesting structure in which migrants first choose a destination region
and then choose a crossing location conditional on the destination choice.26
26 Though the sequential interpretation of the nesting structures is intuitively appealing, the sequence is not
technically imposed by the nested logit model.
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The results from the nested logit specifications are shown in Table 6. The
migrant characteristic variables - age, education, marital status and occupation type - are
noticeably absent from these specifications. As mentioned above, inclusion of these
variables requires interaction with alternative specific dummy variables because migrant
characteristics do not vary across alternatives within choice situations. These interactions
were statistically insignificant when included in the conditionallogit models.
Columns (1) through (3) show results from models utilizing current-year
enforcement values and the models in columns (4) through (6) use lagged enforcement
values. There are three types of models summarized: a standard conditionallogit model,
a nested logit model in which nests are specified according to destination region, and a
nested logit model in which nests are specified according to crossing location.
Enforcement is consistently insignificant in the models using the current-year
enforcement measure. Additionally, the models utilizing lagged measures of border
enforcement universally show greater log-likelihood values than their counterparts using
current measures of border enforcement.
The model in column (5) is a nested logit specification in which nests are
specified according to crossing-state. A likelihood ratio test that the log-sum parameters
are jointly unity is rejected at any of the usual levels of significance, favoring this nested
logit specification over the standard conditionallogit in column (4).27 The log-sum
parameter estimates in this nested logit model are all greater than one, indicating that
greater substitution occurs across nests than within nests. That is, an increase in
27 The standard conditionallogit is recovered from the nested logit by restricting log-sum parameters to
unity.
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enforcement in a given border sector will induce disproportionate diversion of migrants
to alternatives that have other crossing-state components. It should also be noted that
log-sum parameters greater than unity are only consistent with utility maximizing
behavior for a specified range of data.28 I forego any detailed discussion of this aspect of
the model as the nested logit specifications with crossing-state nests have lower log-
likelihood values than models with destination nests.
Results from the model in which nests are specified according to destination
region, shown in column (6), are qualitatively similar to the model in column (5) in terms
of signs and significance ofcoefficients on common variables. The likelihood ratio test
also rejects both the standard conditionallogit model and the crossing-state nested logit
model in favor of the destination nested logit model at any of the usual levels of
significance. In contrast, however, the log-sum parameter estimates all lie between zero
and one. This result indicates that an increase in enforcement in a given border sector
will induce disproportionate diversion of migrants to other alternatives that share the
same destination region. Thus, these estimates imply a degree of persistence in
destination choice. The relative magnitudes of the log-sum parameters suggest that this
persistence is greatest for choices that include Arizona as a destination and least for
choices that include Texas as a destination.
The marginal effects for this preferred nested logit model are shown in Table 7.
These marginal effects are calculated as the average change in the probability of choosing
each alternative given a one percent increase in border enforcement along each state
28 Herriges and Kling (1996) discuss the consistency of nested logit models with utility maximization in the
case that log-sum parameters are greater than one.
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border.29 There are multiple negative effects in response to increases in enforcement.
For example, increases in enforcement along the California border negatively affect the
probability of choosing all alternatives that include a California border crossing
component. This is a result of the negative effect of enforcement on choosing a given
alternative. Of course, the ultimate effect of interest is how enforcement affects the
probability of choosing destination regions within the US. The marginal effects of
enforcement on the probability of choosing destination regions are shown in Table 8.
Notably, the probability of choosing each state on the border is negatively influenced by
increases in enforcement along its border. Enforcement increases in Arizona and Texas
also negatively influence the probability of choosing interior states.
The varying magnitudes of the marginal effects discussed above suggest that a
given increase in border enforcement will more strongly influence the probability of
choosing some US destinations than others. Furthermore, a one percent increase in
border enforcement in California, where annual line-watch hours per mile are relatively
high, will be more costly in terms of additional border agents than a one percent increase
in border enforcement in either Arizona or Texas, where annual line-watch hours per mile
are relatively low. Table 9 shows the change in proportion of migrants choosing each
destination region for an annual lOO,OOO line-watch hour increase in border enforcement
along each state's border. 30 It also shows the change in the absolute number of migrants
choosing each destination region for the same increase in enforcement, based on an
29 Another commonly used approach in calculating marginal effects in discrete choice models is to
calculate the marginal effects at sample means or medians of the explanatory variables.
30 In the conversion from percentage changes to absolute changes in enforcement, year 2000 values ofline-
watch hours were used as the base.
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annual flow of 500,000 illegal immigrants. The estimates suggest that California border
enforcement is most effective in reducing migration to its state. Adding 100,000 line-
watch hours annually along the California border reduces the proportion of migrants
going to California by almost three percentage points. The estimates indicate that the
bulk of these diverted migrants go to Texas and interior states. A similar increase in
annual line-watch hours on the Texas border would reduce the proportion ofmigrants
going to Texas by 1.7 percentage points. This is comparative to the diversionary effect of
Texas enforcement on the proportion of migrants choosing California. The same increase
in enforcement along the Arizona border has a relatively small effect, reducing the
proportion ofmigrants that goes to Arizona by only .18 percentage points. The largest
diversionary effect of Arizona is for California, with the increase in line-watch hours in
Arizona increasing the proportion 0 f migrants going to California by almost 1.4
percentage points.
The distribution of border enforcement also appears relevant to interior states. An
increase in enforcement along the Arizona border decreases the proportion of migrants
choosing interior destinations by almost two percentage points. This effect on choosing
interior states is much weaker for Texas-border enforcement increases. Nevertheless, the
negative effects suggest that migrants traveling to interior states may typically choose to
cross in Texas and Arizona.
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111.6. Conclusion
Previous literature on border enforcement has focused primarily on the deterrent
effect ofborder enforcement initiatives on migration. The few studies that address
migrant diversion in response to geographically targeted increases in border enforcement
explore only border enforcement's effect on crossing location choice. The true
implications of migrant diversion for US communities, however, depend on whether the
estimated diversion effects of enforcement ultimately influence migrants' destination
choices. Using a nested logit model of migrants' joint crossing-destination choices, I
document that greater border enforcement in a given border region decreases the
likelihood of crossing the border in that region. The estimated nesting parameters
suggest that migrants tend to substitute more across crossing locations than across
destination regions. That is, migrants can be characterized as being relatively persistent
in making destination choices. Diversionary effects of enforcement on destination choice
are relatively small, with the greatest degree of substitution between Texas and
California. California and the interior states also exhibit a relatively high degree of
substitution, followed closely by Arizona and California.
These results suggest that border enforcement officials could improve the efficacy
of border enforcement policies through a coordinated approach, rather than the
geographically concentrated methods they have employed thus far. The analysis also
suggests that state governments need to consider enforcement of border regions other
than their own in reducing illegal immigration to their respective states.
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This evidence also provides a partial explanation for small wage and employment
effects of increased enforcement for border cities in the US, especially if the estimated
persistence in destination states also applies for destination cities. Migrants may be
diverted to alternate crossing locations in response to greater enforcement, but there may
be only minor effects on wages or employment in border cities if there is but a small
degree of destination diversion among migrants who are intent on border cities as
destinations.
While this analysis provides several insights as to the nature of border
enforcement's influence on destination choice - in particular the interdependency of
illegal immigration and regional border enforcement policies - they do not address
policies for reducing illegal immigration once the border has been crossed. Thus, one
issue of particular relevance to state governments is the possible interdependency among
states with respect to illegal immigration enforcement in each state's interior, via checks
on employment documentation, etc. Future research might include exploring how
interior enforcement may influence destination choices for illegal immigrants.
55
CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND MEXICAN MIGRATION
IV.l. Introduction
Concern over the significant flows of illegal Mexican immigrants to the United
States has grown substantially in the last two decades, as evidenced by the dramatic
increase in enforcement along the US-Mexico border. The primary instrument of the US
government in controlling illegal immigration, line-watch hours, increased from
approximately two million hours annually in 1980 to almost nine million hours annually
in 2000. A growing body ofliterature indicates that such increased enforcement is
largely ineffective in deterring illegal immigration to the US (Hanson, Robertson, &
Spilimbergo, 2002; Kossoudji, 1992; Donato, Durand, & Massey, 1992). This inefficacy
is particularly striking given the $2.2 billion the US government spends annually on
border enforcement (Hanson, 2005). Among other approaches, increased investment in
Mexico has been promoted as an alternative to border enforcement as a deterrent of
migration. In 1992, amidst ongoing negotiations for the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), then Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari wrote: ".. .ifwe
do not create additional jobs in Mexico, Mexicans will merely walk across the border
looking for jobs in the north. We want to export goods, not people" (Hadjian, 1992, p.
46). This notion is supported by research indicating that investment by multinational
firms seeking lower labor costs increases employment opportunities and raises wages in
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Mexico, thus reducing the net benefit ofmigration to the US (Jones, 2001; Massey &
Espinosa, 1997, Davila & Saenz, 1990).
Despite the large and increasing flows of US foreign direct investment (FDI) into
Mexico and the growing concern over Mexican migration in the US, the effect of this
type of investment ofresources on Mexican immigration remains an open question. For
example, existing literature provides mixed evidence on the effects ofFDI on Mexican
wages (Jensen & Rosas, 2007; Markusen & Zahniser, 1999; Feenstra & Hanson, 1997;
Markusen & Venables, 1997). Similarly, there are conflicting views on the role ofhome-
country wages in determining migration propensity more generally (DaVanzo, 1976;
Stark & Taylor, 1991; Greenwood, 1997; Lucas, 1997). Rising above questioning the
particular mechanism through which variation in FDI might influence patterns of
migration, this paper uses data on FDI flows into Mexican states and individual-level
survey data from Mexican households to explore the relationship between Mexican-
bound FDI and Mexican immigration to the US.
The next section discusses the geographic and time-series variation in FDI flows
to Mexico since the 1980s. Section IV.3 reviews the extant literature. In Section IVA I
describe the data used in the empirical analysis that is presented in Section IV.5. Section
IV.6 concludes and offers some suggestions for future research.
IV.2. Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico
Mexico received relatively small infusions of foreign direct investment (FDI)
during the 1980s due to some efforts to liberalize the financial sector and gradual
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relaxation of restrictions on import and export licenses for intermediate goods. The
dramatic increases in FDI, however, did not occur until the mid-1990s as restrictions on
FDI were relaxed beginning in 1994, in accordance with NAFTA terms. Figure 1 shows
both FDI stock in and flows to Mexico in both nominal and year-2000 US dollars over
the period 1981 to 2006. FDI stock in Mexico has grown consistently since the early
1980s. In years previous to 1994, FDI stock increases relatively slowly and FDI flows
are relatively constant. Consistent with NAFTA-induced investment, Figure 4 evidences
a large increase in the flow ofFDI to Mexico in 1994. This is followed by lower levels
of flows in 1995 and 1996, which was likely due to the Mexican peso crisis in late 1995.
Shortly thereafter, however, FDI flows increase once again reaching a peak in 2001.
The geographic distribution of cumulative FDI inflows for the six-year period
following the implementation NAFTA is shown in Figure 5. Mexican states are shaded
according the sum ofFDI inflows over the period 1994 -1999. The various shades
indicate the quintiles of these cumulative flows, with darker shades representing higher
flow values. Most striking is the concentration ofpost-NAFTA FDI flows in states along
the US-Mexico border. There is also a large concentration ofFDI in the area surrounding
Mexico City. One reason for this is that firms often register FDI at their headquarters,
located in Mexico City, when the ultimate destination of the FDI is in other states.
Additionally, the Distrito Federal- the state which includes Mexico City - has an
unusually large financial services component to its FDI flows.
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IV.3. Literature
A growing body ofliterature documents the complex effects ofFDI on labor
markets in receiving countries. Several papers (Markusen & Zahniser, 1999; Lopez &
Schiff, 1998; Feenstra & Hanson, 1997; Markusen & Venables, 1997) provide theoretical
motivation and empirical evidence of differential effects ofFDI based on worker skill
levels, suggesting that employer demand due to FDI is biased toward relatively skilled
workers. In support of these findings, evidence from Jensen and Rosas (2007) indicates
that greater FDI flows are positively correlated with wage inequality within Mexican
states. Furthermore, a study by Ernst (2005) shows differential wage effects depending
on the sectoral composition and type ofFDI inflows.
The standard model of migration predicts that, in the absence of financing
constraints, the incentive to migrate should be reduced by greater employment
opportunities and higher wages in Mexico that may result from FDI. Other strands of the
FDI literature suggest the existence oftechnology spillovers, wherein the entry of foreign
firms introduce new production technology and innovations that is then adopted by
domestic firms. Nevertheless, studies of migration within countries (Greenwood, 1997;
Lucas, 1997) have found no significant relationship between migration propensities and
"push" factors, such as wages and employment in the origin. Additionally, analyses of
Mexico-US migration find weak influences of these factors on migration propensity.
Models which augment the standard theory with migration financing constraints may
provide a reasonable explanation for the lack of consensus (see for example, Stark &
Taylor, 1991; DaVanzo, 1976; and Lopez & Schiff, 1998). The proponents ofthese
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models posit the existence ofmigration financing constraints that prevent migration by
those who would have otherwise migrated. Increases in wages can relax this financing
constraint for relatively low wage earners, resulting in higher migration rates, while wage
increases have negative effects on migration propensity for relatively high wage earners.
Several existing studies present evidence suggestive of an important relationship
between FDI and emigration, examining how migration rates are correlated with
measures of maquiladora activity and female labor force participation rates (e.g. Massey
& Espinosa, 1997; Davila & Saenz, 1990; Jones, 2001). Alternatively, Aroca and
Maloney (2006) use Mexican census data to examine how state-level FDI affects internal
migration rates between pairs ofMexican states. They briefly address the issue of
migration to the US, providing back-of-the-envelope calculations that indicate FDI
decreases the likelihood ofmigration to the United States.
IVA. Data
In the context of Aroca and Maloney's analysis, ideally one would prefer to have
annual data on migration rates for each Mexican state. One could then exploit both cross-
sectional and time-series variation in FDI across Mexican states to test whether state-
level migration rates are correlated with state-level FDI. Unfortunately, the available
census data do not include annual migration rates. This absence, combined with several
other features of the census data, suggests that an alternative approach is necessary. First,
the data concerning migration to the US is generated as a response to the question of
whether someone in the household has been to the US in the previous five years. As a
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result, the census does not provide information about the migration history of the
household prior to the last five years. Thus, in an analysis of US migration at the
Mexican state level, the effect ofFDI may be confounded with the effect of state-specific
migration propensity that is unrelated to the level ofFDI in the origin state. Failing to
include the prior migration history may result in seriously misleading conclusions. For
example, ifFDI tends to go to Mexican states with relatively low migration rates, one
might conclude that FDI reduces migration to the US. Conversely, ifFDI tends to go to
Mexican states with relatively high migration rates, one might conclude that FDI
increases migration to the US.
The disadvantages from using census data suggest that an alternative approach
will be needed. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP) is a collaborative effort of
Princeton University and the University of Guadalajara. To uncover any potential
diversion effects of non-uniform border protection I use data provided by the Mexican
Migration Project (MMP), a collaborative effort ofPrinceton University and the
University of Guadalajara. The MMP surveys began in 1982, and have been conducted
annually from 1987 through 2004. Each survey year, interviewers randomly select
approximately 200 households from each of two to five Mexican communities. Though
households within communities are selected at random, the communities are located in
Mexican states whose residents have historically had high propensities for migration to
the United States. As no community is surveyed twice, the data are repeated cross-
sections that cover 107 communities in 19 Mexican states. 3l The survey collects
31 The data used in the current analysis do not contain observations from household heads in the Distrito
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demographic and economic characteristics of each community and each household,
personal migration histories for each family member in the household, and life histories
of each household head. Since each household head is only surveyed once, these life
histories comprise an unbalanced panel data set. Included in these life histories is a
yearly account of each household head's migrations. I use this information to construct a
binary variable for each person-year observation that indicates whether or not the
household head migrated to the US.
I combine these household-head migration histories with annual data on FDI in
Mexico to examine the effects of FDI on migration. Aggregated measures of stocks and
flows ofFDI are available online from the Secretaria de Economia for the years 1981 -
2005. This office also provides flows ofFDI at the state level for the years 1999 - 2005.
Andre Mollick generously provided FDI flows by Mexican state for the years 1994 -
1999. Unfortunately, FDI data at the state-level are not available prior to 1994. This
limitation necessitates placing one of two restrictions on the empirical approach. First, a
straightforward analysis can be had by limiting the sample to person-year observations
from 1994 forward. This approach carries with it the minor disadvantage of reducing the
number of available observations. A second approach, which uses observations from
both before and after 1994, requires some simplifying assumptions about the geographic
distribution ofFDI flows in order to maintain a tractable empirical strategy.
Federale. Therefore, empirical specifications will not include variables designed to distinguish this
region from others. The issue remains, however, that the ultimate destinations of a part of the FDI
flows attributed to the Distrito Federale are elsewhere in Mexico. This caveat should accompany all
interpretations of relevant estimates in the specifications to follow.
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IV,5, Empirical Analysis
IV.5.l Border States As Proxy For FDI Flows
I consider two separate empirical approaches in identifying the effect ofFDI
flows on migration propensity. The first approach is motivated by the apparent positive
correlation between border proximity and FDI flows from 1994 to 1999. That is, one can
exploit two tendencies in the data. First, Mexico received a significant infusion ofFDI
following NAFTA. Second, this FDI fell disproportionately to border-states. If FDI
flows do influence the migration decision, then the implementation ofNAFTA - acting
as a proxy for the timing ofFDI - should influence the migration decision differently for
migrants living in border-states versus non-border states. While this method is attractive
in its simplicity, it does not make direct use of the available FDI data. Admittedly, there
may be other macroeconomic influences on migration that are correlated with FDI and
that are not included in the empirical specifications. It will be important to have in mind
this caveat when interpreting the results.
To simplify the analysis, I analyze US migration from 1989 to 1999. I select this
time period since 1999 is the end of the period covered by the data provided by and used
in Aroca and Maloney (2006). Additionally, the implementation ofNAFTA falls in the
middle of this window. Since the MMP surveys began before NAFTA and are
administered only once for each household head, not all household heads surveyed will
have sufficient information to be included in the analysis. Furthermore, the migration
behavior of a household head will be censored ifhis community was sampled shortly
after NAFTA came into effect. Thus, I include in the sample only migrants for whom
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there exists a person-year observation for each year in the sample period. This restriction
results in a balanced panel of 955 migrants over 11 years. The panel nature of the data
will allow treatment of the individual-specific migration propensity, diminishing the
likelihood of confounding its effects with the effects ofFDI flows.
Other variables included in each specification can be broadly categorized at the
individual, community, and national levels. Individual-level variables include, age, years
of education, number of children, marital status, an interaction between the household
head's marital status and employment status of the household head's spouse, and
characteristics of the migrant's primary occupation and personal migration experience.
The primary occupation variables are based on each household head's primary
occupation as reported in the MMP survey and categorize the occupation as skilled or not
and agricultural or not. The personal migration experience variable is calculated as the
cumulative number of months the migrant has spent in the US prior to the observation
year.
Community-level variables include population, female labor force participation
rate, the proportion of adults with more than six years of education, and the proportion of
adults that earn at least twice the minimum wage. These variables are meant to capture
economic opportunities in the household head's community. I also include community's
distance from the Mexico-US border and the community's migration experience.
Distance is measured at the state-level as the logarithm of the distance between the state's
capital and the distance to the nearest border crossing. The community migration
experience variable is calculated as the total number ofmonths spent in the US summed
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across all community members surveyed up to the observation year. This variable is
designed to capture community-specific tendency toward migration to the US as well as
the availability of migrant networks in the US.
National-level variables included in the specification are the unemployment rates
for the US and Mexico and the dollar-peso exchange rate. Following the literature,
distance and annual border enforcement are included to proxy for migration costs.
Border enforcement is measured as the logarithm of line-watch hours in the previous
year. The lagged value is used to reduce the possibility that enforcement is endogenous
to the individual's migration decision. Finally, the specifications also include a linear
time trend.
As the dependent variable indicates the binary choice of whether or not the
household head migrated to the US, one would anticipate using a logit or probit model.
While I do provide estimates from a panel probit, I consider a linear probability model as
the primary empirical approach for two reasons. First, estimation is relatively
straightforward compared to probit or logit models for panel data and the linear
probability model produces qualitatively similar results. Second, the empirical approach
is quite general, and the magnitude of any significant effect found cannot credibly be
interpreted as the marginal effect ofFDI on migration propensity. Thus, I am primarily
concerned with the sign of the effect.
The models in Table 10 show results from models that do not explicitly include
FDI flows. Recognizing that border states received relatively large flows ofFDI
following the implementation ofNAFTA, these models include binary variables
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indicating that NAFTA is in effect and whether or not the migrant lives in a border state.
The interaction of these two indicators should give the marginal effect of living in a
border state after the implementation ofNAFTA - thus the interaction is meant to
provide a rough proxy for FDI flows. The model in column (1) shows results from a
model that does not include state-specific dummies. The estimated coefficient on the
border-state dummy is significant and negative indicating that migration to the US before
NAFTA is less likely for migrants living along the border. The estimates also suggest
that migration is less likely after the implementation ofNAFTA for migrants living in the
Mexican interior, though this effect is only significant at the 10 percent level. Most
importantly, the coefficient on the interaction between these two variables is positive and
significant indicating that the likelihood of migration to the US from border states
increased following NAFTA. The relatively small magnitude of this coefficient
compared to the relatively large magnitude of the border-state dummy coefficient
suggests that both before and after NAFTA, the effect ofliving in a border state has a
negative effect on the likelihood of migration. Ostensibly, these results suggest that FDI
flows increase the likelihood ofmigration lending support to the hypothesis that FDI
may, in fact, relax the migration financing constraints face by potential migrants.
The effects of other variables are generally in concordance with previous studies.
Age has a negative effect on the likelihood of migration to the US, consistent with
findings that immigrants are typically younger. Household heads who report their
primary occupation as being agricultural are more likely to migrate, further evidence that
agricultural migration tends to be temporary and repeated. Both individual and
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community migration experience also have a positive influence on the likelihood of
migration, with individual migration experience playing the larger role.
Two of the variables have effects that may initially be inconsistent with priors,
namely the distance variable and the female labor force participation rate. The positive
effect of distance on the probability ofmigration may be due to a tendency for states in
western Mexico to be common migrant sources and these states are farther from the
border. The female labor force participation rate, which is typically used as a proxy for
the economic health of the community, also has a positive effect on the likelihood of
migration. Though priors suggest that migration is less likely the better the economic
conditions in a community, this positive effect can be explained in thinking about the
migration decision as a household problem. Potential migrants may face a lower
opportunity cost of migration if their spouses are employed. If spouses are more likely to
be employed in communities with higher female labor force participation rates, we may
observe greater migration propensity in such communities. This is consistent with the
positive effect ofFDI on migration propensity if spouses tend to benefit from the greater
employment opportunities and higher wages associated with FDI.
The model shown in column (2) excludes the border state dummy and the
distance variable in lieu of Mexican state fixed effects. The interaction is still included as
it contains variation over time. The coefficient estimates on variables common to both
models remain largely unchanged with the exception of the coefficient on the female
labor force participation rate. This is likely due to female labor force participation rates
exhibiting more variation across communities than within communities.
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Finally, for comparison purposes I also include a panel data probit model with
random effects. This model does not include state-specific dummy variables. The signs
and significance on the explanatory variables in this model are similar to their
counterparts in the linear probability model of column (1).
IV.5.2 Analyses Using Aggregate and State-Level FDI Flows
The results ofthe previous models suggest a potentially significant relationship
between FDI and migration propensity over the sample period in the previous
specifications. Though state-level FDI flows are not available prior to NAFTA, total FDI
flows into Mexico are published beginning in 1980. These aggregate flows provide time-
series variation in FDI with which to analyze the effect ofFDI flows on migration
propensity both before and after NAFTA. Table 11 shows specifications of linear
probability models of US migration using aggregate FDI flows incorporated in several
different ways. None of the models shows FDI to be a significant determinant of
migration to the US, though the effect ofFDI may be dampened by the lack ofvariation
in FDI flows early in the sample period. Table 12 shows results from similar models
with the sample period restricted to post-NAFTA years. There is only marginal evidence
that FDI influences migration propensity when FDI is included as a quadratic in column
(2), however, the effect becomes insignificant when Mexican state dummies are included
in the model. Taken together, these results suggest that any effect ofFDI indicated by the
first empirical strategy is due primarily to cross-sectional variation in FDI flows.
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The next series ofmodels exploit both time-series and cross-sectional variation in
FDI flows at the state level. Since state-level FDI flows are only available beginning in
1994, these specifications model the US migration decision for household heads over the
period 1994 - 2004. Recognizing that the effect ofFDI may differ by geographic region,
I consider, in tum, migration models for all household heads, household heads in border
states, and household heads in non-border states.
In the models that pool household heads across all household regional locations,
the significance ofFDI flows as a detenninant of migration is sensitive to the inclusion of
non-linear effects, as evidenced by columns (1) and (2) in Table 13. There is no
statistically significant effect ofFDI on migration propensity when FDI is included only
linearly. At first blush, the results from column (2) appear to contradict the positive
effect ofFDI found in earlier models that used the interaction ofNAFTA and border
states to proxy for FDI flows. Though the estimated linear effect is negative, the positive
coefficient estimate on the quadratic tenn actually reverses the effect ofFDI in states that
receive the highest levels ofFDI. As no households in the sample were located in
Mexico City, the household heads whose states received the highest flows ofFDI were in
border states. In particular, the FDI flows received by Nuevo Leon in 1997 and 2000
were of a magnitude large enough that FDI increases the propensity for migration.
Of course, it is possible that the effect ofFDI for household heads in border states
is different from the effect ofFDI for those in the Mexican interior. The non-linear effect
ofFDI could arise empirically if, for example, FDI flows increase the probability of
migration for border-state residents but decrease the probability of migration for interior
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residents. Table 14 repeats the specifications shown in Table 13, but for a sub-sample
consisting only of household heads in border states. That the estimates in columns (2)
and (4) remain of similar sign and significance for this sub-sample provides evidence that
the non-linear effect is not due solely to a difference in the relationship between FDI
flows and migration propensity between border and interior regions. There is, however,
one important difference between the estimates for this sub-sample and the estimates for
the entire sample. Namely, the magnitudes ofFDI flows in the sample period for the
border states are not sufficiently large to ever cause the marginal effect ofFDI to be
positive. Thus, FDI flows to border states negatively influence the probability of
migration to the US, albeit at a diminishing rate.
Similar specifications for the sub-sample consisting of household heads in interior
states, shown in Table 15, provide mixed evidence that the non-linear effect ofFDI
persists in interior states. The magnitudes and significance of the FDI variables in
column (2) are roughly similar to their counterparts in the border-state models. When
state-specific dummies are included in the model, however, FDI is an insignificant
determinant of migration.
IV. 5. 3 Multinomial Logit Models ofMigration
Based on the preceding evidence, it would appear that FDI affects migration
propensity more so for household heads in border states than for household heads in
interior states. The negative effect ofFDI on migration to the US from border states is
consistent with the notion that FDI provides employment opportunities in Mexico,
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thereby increasing the opportunity cost ofmigration to the US. If this is a valid
hypothesis, then in addition to reduced migration, one might reasonably expect that FDI
flows are correlated with changes in the emploYment characteristics of household heads
that do not migrate. To address such a possibility, I use a multinomia110git approach to
model the household head's decision each year to migrate to the US, remain in Mexico
and change emploYment, or remain in Mexico in his current emploYment.
The MMP data include for each year the reported occupation of each household
head, the location of emploYment, and a binary indicator of emploYment change. I use
this binary indicator combined with the location of emploYment to construct the
dependent variable for the mu1tinomia110git specification. The household head can be
categorized in one of three ways. First, he may experience no emploYment change and
remain in Mexico. Second, he may experience an emploYment change while remaining
in Mexico. Finally, I categorize as the group of US migrants those household heads that
had emploYment in the US and mayor may not have reported an emploYment change.
Panel A of Table 16 presents the results of this mu1tinomia110git model for
household heads residing in all Mexican states. In these and all subsequent models,
effects indicated by coefficients should be interpreted relative to the choice to remain in
Mexico in current emploYment. Thus, the negative coefficient on the FDI flow variable
in column (2) indicates that greater FDI flows are associated with lower likelihood of
migration to the US relative to remaining in Mexico in current emploYment. The non-
linear effect ofFDI on US migration remains in these specifications and is robust to the
----- --_._------_._--------_.
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inclusion of state-specific dummy variables. Foreign direct investment also does not
appear to influence non-migrants' employment.
Panels Band C of Table 16 divide the sample in two sub-samples, an important
distinction as earlier models indicate that the effect ofFDI may be different for household
heads in border states than for household heads in interior states. Panel B shows results
for the border state sub-sample. Columns (1) and (3) indicate a non-linear effect ofFDI
on the propensity for employment change. Furthermore, the effect exhibits opposing
patterns for employment change and US migration. That is, FDI flows in border states
increase the probability of employment change at a decreasing rate and also decrease the
probability ofUS migration at a decreasing rate. These results are again consistent with
the general hypothesis that greater FDI in Mexico reduces migration by providing
employment opportunities and increasing the opportunity cost of migration.
Panel C of Table 16 shows similar specifications for the interior state sub-sample.
The estimates indicate that the positive employment effect ofFDI is limited to household
heads in border states. For residents of interior states, the signs of the estimated
coefficients suggest a pattern for employment changes that is similar to that for US
migration. The negative effect, however, is not statistically significant and the second
order effect is only significant at the 90 percent significance level.
Taken together, the results from these multinomiallogit specifications provide
evidence that greater investment in Mexico, and in border states in particular, is
associated with both household head employment changes and reduced propensity for US
migration. For household heads in interior states, foreign direct investment has similar
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effects on the likelihood ofUS migration, but does not appear to induce similar
employment changes. One possible explanation for this difference may be differences in
the type of foreign direct investment flowing to border states versus interior states. For
example, there may be no real gain in employment opportunities from FDI that is
primarily portfolio investment or mergers and acquisitions of existing firms. The lack of
impact ofFDI on employment changes in interior states may therefore be due to a
tendency for this type ofFDI to flow to interior states. Likewise, FDI in border states, in
the form of maquiladoras, may lead to comparatively larger increases in employment
opportunities. Thus, the difference in the effect ofFDI across these regions may be due
to differences in the type ofFDI typically flowing to each region.
IV.6. Conclusion
Proponents ofNAFTA have pointed to reduced migration from Mexico to the US
as an ancillary benefit of the investment in Mexico that would accompany NAFTA.
Despite the large expenditure on border enforcement by the US government and a
consensus in the literature that this border enforcement is ineffective in reducing
immigration, there are few studies that investigate the effect of investment in Mexico on
migration to the US. I use retrospective survey data from household heads in Mexico and
state-level FDI flows to specify a linear probability model of household head migration to
the US. I document that household heads in border states are generally less likely to
migrate to the US in response to greater FDI flows and that this marginal effect is
diminishing in the size ofFDI flows. I find a similar effect for household heads in
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interior states, though the results for this sub-sample of household heads are not robust.
To investigate whether FDI reduces migration in border states by increasing employment
opportunities, I use the same data to specify a multinomiallogit model wherein
household heads may remain in Mexico in their current employment, remain in Mexico
and change employment, or migrate to the US. These models suggest that FDI flows are
associated positively with employment changes and negatively with migration propensity
for household heads in border states, lending credence to the benefits of investment
espoused by NAFTA proponents. In contrast, household heads in interior states do not
appear to respond to greater FDI flows with employment changes, but FDI does reduce
the probability of migration among this sub-sample of household heads.
Though the focus of the current analysis is on Mexican migration to the US, the
results have wider implications for other regions of the world. In particular, Western
European countries may use investment as an alternative to border enforcement or
restrictions on immigrant rights to alleviate immigration pressures from Eastern Europe.
Finally, variation in the type ofFDI flowing to particular Mexican regions
provides one explanation for the contrasting effects for household heads in border states
versus interior states. These differences suggest that extensions of this analysis that
include variation in FDI flows at the sector level would provide further conclusions
regarding the effect of FDI on migration.
APPENDIX A
TABLES
Table 1. Log-Wage Equation wi Single-Selection: Most Recent US Trips
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Partial ML: Most Recent Trips
(1) (2)
Two-Step: Most Recent Trips
(3) (4)
Log(US wage) Migration
Rho (p-value)
Lambda
US trip duration (mos.)
Cum. US experience (mos.)
(Cumulative US expi
Illegal
Unemployment rate in dest.
Cost of Living
Distance (origin-destination)
Skilled
Agricultural worker
Wage Differential
Manied
Num. of Children
Father migrant
Female LFP
% of Adult wi 6+ years ed.
Population of origin
Line-watch Hours
US unemployment rate
Mexican unemployment rate
Peso-Dollar exchange rate
LogCUS wage)
0.153 (0.042)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.001 )
-0.000***
(0.000)
-0.102***
(0.032)
-0.020***
(0.005)
-0.004***
(0.001)
0.000***
(0.000)
0.090***
(0.032)
-0.116***
(0.035)
Migration
-0.206***
(0.046)
-0.036
(0.047)
0.256***
(0.042)
-0.115**
(0.049)
-0.028***
(0.009)
0.747***
(0.049)
1.884***
(0.341)
-1.477***
(0.243)
-0.477***
(0.087)
-0.000***
(0.000)
-24.661 ***
(2.383)
8.783***
(3.254)
-0.128***
0.089**
(0.040)
0.003***
(0.000)
0.003***
(0.001 )
-0.000***
(0.000)
-0.102***
(0.032)
-0.021 ***
(0.005)
-0.004***
(0.001 )
0.000***
(0.000)
0.089***
(0.032)
-0.116***
(0.035)
-0.201 ***
(0.046)
-0.030
(0.047)
0.259***
(0.042)
-0.114**
(0.049)
-0.027***
(0.009)
0.752***
(0.049)
1.898***
(0.342)
-1.457***
(0.244)
-0.478***
(0.088)
-0.000***
(0.000)
-24.453***
Measure of Fit
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses.
time trend, and a constant..
Wald X' (13) - 287.93 Wald X' (17) = 695.65
7300 7300
* p<o.lo, ** p<0.05, *** p<o.ol. All equations also include age, age2, years of education, linear
Table 2. Log-wage Equation wi Single-Selection: First Trips Only
Two Step: All Earners
(1) (2)
Two Step: Middle 50% Earners
(3) (4)
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Log-wage Migration
A. (selection into migration)
Duration of 151 US trip (mos.)
Illegal
Skilled occup. (1 51 US trip)
Agricultural occup. (1 51 US trip)
Unemployment rate in des!.
Cost-of-Living in des!.
Distance (origin-destination)
Constant
Year
Wage Differential
Father migrant
Married
Children
Skilled
Agricultural worker
FemaleLFPR
% of Adult wi 6+ years of ed.
Population of origin
Line-watch Hours
US unemployment rate
Mexican unemployment rate
Peso-Dollar exchange rate
Avg. distance from origin
0.073
(0.070)
0.003***
(0.001 )
-0.080
(0.060)
0.062
(0.051)
-0.077
(0.061 )
-0.009
(0.008)
-0.007***
(0.002)
0.000***
(0.000)
-45.608***
(17.364)
0.024***
(0.009)
Log-wage Migration
-0.043**
(0.019)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.040**
(0.020)
0.040**
(0.016)
0.034*
(0.019)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.000
(0.000)
17.730 -1.659 13.193
(40.377) (5.401) (52.576)
-0.006 0.002 -0.004
(0.020) (0.003) (0.026)
0.478*** 0.447***
(0.059) (0.076)
0.177** 0.177*
(0.076) (0.094)
-0.336*** -0.432 ***
(0.060) (0.074)
-0.045*** -0.065***
(0.014) (0.018)
-0.123** -0.132*
(0.061) (0.079)
-0.063 -0.010
(0.069) (0.087)
3.781 *** 4.123***
(0.475) (0.604)
-2.483*** -2.999***
(0.331) (0.426)
-0.157 -0.079
(0.111) (0.148)
-0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
-20.678*** -18.765***
(3.050) (3.869)
0.435 -5.073
(4.747) (6.320)
0.008 0.029
(0.051) (0.068)
-0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Measure of Fit
Observations
Standard errors in parentheses.
Wald X' (15) - 442.75 Wald X2 (15) - 209.35
10099 9735
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.OI. All equations also include age, age2, and years of education.
Table 3. Double - Selection Model First Stage: Selection into Migration and Repeat Migration
Modell: First US trip vars. excluded Model 2: First US trip vars. included
(I) (2) (3) (4)
Repeat Migrant Migrant Repeat Migrant Migrant
Log(real US wage) (1st trip) 0.283***
(0.049)
Duration of 151 US trip 0.002
(0.001)
Skilled Occ. (I st trip) -0.375***
(0.079)
Agricultural Occ. (151 trip) 0.230***
(0.061)
US unemployment rate -24.025*** -23.977***
(2.115) (1.689)
Skilled occ. (primary) -0.061 -0.195*** -0.196***
(0.073) (0.047) (0.041)
Agricultural occ. (primary) -0.035 -0.011 -0.011
(0.064) (0.049) (0.042)
Wage Differential -0.212*** 0.316*** -0.219*** 0.315***
(0.063) (0.044) (0.062) (0.039)
Father migrant 0.620*** 0.693*** 0.618*** 0.694***
(0.079) (0.050) (0.079) (0.038)
Married 0.279*** -0.136*** 0.295*** -0.136***
(0.070) (0.043) (0.070) (0.035)
Children -0.037** -0.037*** -0.028* -0.037***
(0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009)
Female LFP -1.445*** 1.815*** -1.527*** 1.813***
(0.495) (0.331 ) (0.498) (0.300)
% of Adult wi 6+ years ed. 0.488 -1.259*** 0.397 -1.260***
(0.353) (0.243) (0.353) (0.220)
Population of origin -0.308* -0.774*** -0.259 -0.774***
(0.178) (0.099) (0.178) (0.093)
Line-watch hours -0.000*** 0.000* -0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. distance from origin -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mexican unemployment rate -25.005*** 18.788*** -23.496*** 18.817***
(3.762) (2.533) (3.833) (2.305)
Peso-Dollar exchange rate 0.080* -0.190*** 0.065 -0.190***
(0.044) (0.031 ) (0.044) (0.029)
Year 0.052** 0.020 0.064*** 0.020*
(0.021) (0.012) (0.021 ) (0.011)
Constant -106.579** -35.173 -130.660*** 68.391 ***
(41.745) (24.650) (42.102) (14.071)
Rho (p) -0.079 -0.101
(0.117) (0.112)
Obs. 8499 8499
Log-L -4855.353 -4838.675
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.IO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.OI. All equations also include age, age2, and years of education.
76
Table 4. Log-Wage Equation For Repeat Migrants
Log-Wage Model
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A.2 (selection into repeat migration)
A.\ (selection into migration)
(I)
No Selection
(2)
Single Selection
0.030
(0.045)
(3)
Double-Selection
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.047"
(0.019)
Log(l st US trip wage)
Duration of Ist US trip
Duration of most recent trip
Cumulative US experience
(Cumulative US exp.)2
Illegal (most recent US trip)
Skilled occ. (most recent US trip)
Agricultural occ. (most recent US trip)
Year
Unemployment rate at destination
Cost-of-living at destination
Origin-Destination Distance (mi.)
Constant
0.270*" 0.270*" 0.294***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
-0.002*" -0.002*" -0.002*"
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.003"* 0.003*" 0.003*"
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.002*" 0.003*" 0.002"
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
-0.000 -0.000" -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.105*" -0.104** -0.090**
(0.039) (0.041) (0.038)
0.036 0.017 0.029
(0.045) (0.046) (0.043)
-0.092" -0.102** -0.117"*
(0.045) (0.048) (0.045)
0.004 0.008 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
-0.020*** -0.022"* -0.020"*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
-0.001 -0.004*" -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-6.768 -12.878 -7.849
(16.026) (15.508) (14.086)
Obs.
R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses.
711 711 711
0.952 0.959
* p<O.IO, .. p<0.05, *** p<O.OI. All equations also include age, age2, and years of education.
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Table 5. Probit models of Califomia Choice - Lagged Enforcement Measures
No Enforcement Lagged Measures of Border Enforcement
(I) (2) (3) (4)
Total Annual Hours (t-I)
-0.831 ***
(0.250)
LW hpm (t-I) - CA -0.197
(0.248)
LW hpm (t-I) - non-CA -0.667*
(0.343)
LW hpm (t-I) - CA -0.197
(0.249)
LW hpm (t-I) - AZ -0.700
(0.473)
LWhpm(t-I)-TX -0.060
(0.460)
Age -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of education 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Children 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.148** -0.152** -0.152** -0.153**
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
Skilled worker -0.081 -0.080 -0.080 -0.079
(0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080)
Agricultural worker -0.048 -0.047 -0.047 -0.048
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
Has been to CA 0.945*** 0.944*** 0.944*** 0.943***
(0.091) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Prevo months in CA 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Prevo months in non-CA -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Comm. Mig Exp. to CA 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Comm. Mig Exp. to non-CA -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg DE rate (CA MSAs) 0.043 -0.046 -0.036 -0.037
(0.044) (0.052) (0.058) (0.059)
Avg DE rate (non-CA MSAs) -0.102 -0.015 -0.024 -0.015
(0.082) (0.086) (0.089) (0.090)
Avg real income pc (CA MSAs) 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg real income pc (non-CA MSAs) -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year 0.229*** 0.118* 0.118* 0.031
(0.050) (0.061) (0.062) (0.103)
Dist to AZ border 0.239 0.222 0.222 0.258
(0.874) (0.873) (0.872) (0.868)
Dist to CA border -0.368 -0.345 -0.345 -0.375
(0.766) (0.765) (0.765) (0.760)
Dist to TX border 1.560*** 1.575*** 1.570*** 1.569***
(0.256) (0.256) (0.256) (0.256)
Constant -452.685*** -227.859* -227.059* -53.543
(99.262) (121.586) (122.669) (204.521)
Obs. 3883 3883 3883 3883
Log-L -1612.813 -1608.477 -1608.412 -1607.793
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.IO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.OI
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Table 6. Nested Logit Specifications of Migrants' Joint Destination-Crossing Choice
Current Current Current Lagged Lagged Lagged
Measures Measures Measures Measures Measures Measures
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Enforcement -0.138 -0.164 -0.056 -0.669** -0.700** -0.310**
(0.238) (0.241) (0.113) (0.275) (0.279) (0.144)
Distance to Border -1.981*** -1.901*** -0.957*** -1.998*** -1.918*** -0.976***
(0.218) (0.225) (0.202) (0.218) (0.225) (0.203)
Previous Crossings 0.972*** 0.948*** 0.483*** 0.975*** 0.951 *** 0.490***
(0.055) (0.056) (0.088) (0.055) (0.056) (0.088)
(Prev. Crossings)2 -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.Ql9*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.020***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
VME 2.545*** 3.178*** 2.617*** 2.545*** 3.185*** 2.616***
(0.107) (0.221) (0.106) (0.107) (0.221 ) (0.106)
PME 1.449*** 1.784*** 1.546*** 1.448*** 1.786*** 1.544***
(0.108) (0.161) (0.1 08) (0.108) (0.162) (0.108)
PME*PMmonths 1.073*** 1.449*** 1.256*** 1.076*** 1.459*** 1.255***
(0.268) (0.355) (0.262) (0.269) (0.357) (0.262)
Dest. Distance 1.937 2.184 1.059 1.887 2.141 1.040
(3.272) (4.069) (3.035) (3.274) (4.077) (3.038)
Dest. UE rate -0.002 -0.009 -0.001 -0.003 -0.011 -0.002
(0.027) (0.032) (0.026) (0.027) (0.032) (0.026)
Dest. Real Inc PC -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
All. Spec. Constants Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination Nests
(log-sum param.)
Interior 0.453*** 0.457***
(0.085) (0.085)
AZ 0.242*** 0.245***
(0.081 ) (0.081 )
CA 0.443*** 0.448***
(0.091 ) (0.090)
TX 0.506*** 0.510***
(0.107) (0.107)
Crossing Nests
(log-sum param.)
AZ 1.126*** 1.128***
(0.118) (0.118)
CA 1.405*** 1.408***
(0.106) (0.106)
TX 1.262*** 1.266***
(0.102) (0.102)
LR Test of
homosced.
Chi2 (d.f.) 19.9 (3)*** 40.2 (4)*** 20.6 (3)*** 39.9 (4)***
Obs. 30700 30700 30700 30700 30700 30700
Log-L -3184.308 -3174.354 -3164.199 -3181.501 -3171.420 -3161.562
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.Ol.
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Average effect on probability of choosing alternative with respect
Joint Alternative to percentage increase in enforcement along state border
Destination Crossing AZ CA TX
Interior Arizona -0.0188 0.0090 0.0096
(0.0202) (0.0103) (0.0123)
Interior California 0.0064 -0.0138 0.0074
(0.0088) (0.0168) (0.0094)
Interior Texas 0.0083 0.0090 -0.0173
(0.0113) (0.0099) (0.0195)
Arizona Arizona -0.0013 0.0004 0.0012
(0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0016)
Arizona Texas 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0008
(0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012)
California Arizona -0.0042 0.0036 0.0006
(0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0008)
California California 0.0066 -0.0168 0.0104
(0.0070) (0.0149) (0.0104)
California Texas 0.0004 0.0044 -0.0048
(0.0006) (0.0062) (0.0066)
Texas California 0.0007 -0.0021 0.0018
(0.0010) (0.0033) (0.0030)
Texas Texas 0.0161 0.0054 -0.0081
(0.0362) (0.0067) (0.0093)
T bl 7 Alt
Standard DevIatIOns In parentheses.
Table 8. State-Level Elasticities for Nested Logit Model with Destination Region Nests
Average effect on probability of choosing destination region with
respect to percentage increase in enforcement along state border
Destination Region AZ CA TX
IN
AZ
CA
TX
-0.00408 0.004243 -0.00031
(0.003862) (0.004693) (0.003558)
-0.00037 0.001249 0.000422
(0.000751) (0.001299) (0.000813)
0.002891 -0.00884 0.006233
(0.003251) (0.007884) (0.006053)
0.001565 0.003352 -0.00634
(0.002154) (0.004005) (0.00696)
Standard Deviations in parentheses.
Table 9. State-Level Marginal Effects for Nested Logit Model with Destination Region Nests
Average effect on probability of choosing destination region with respect to
100,000 annual line-watch hour increase in enforcement along state border
(Change in annual number of migrants choosing destination region with respect
to 100,000 annual line-watch hour increase in enforcement along state border
based on annual 500,000 illegal immigrants)
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Destination Ree;ion
IN
AZ
-0.0197
(-9850)
CA
0.0142
(7100)
TX
-0.0008
(-400)
AZ -0.0018 0.0042 0.0011(-900) (2100) (550)
CA 0.0139 -0.0297 0.0169(6950) (-14850) (8450)
TX 0.0075 0.0112 -0.0172(3750) (5600) (-8600)
Table 10. Panel Linear Probability Models and Probit Model of Migration using FDI proxy
Random Effects Random Effects: State Random Effects Panel
Dummies Probit
(I) (2) (3)
NAFTA -0.027* -0.028* -0.261 *
(0.014) (0.014) (0.134)
NAFTA*Border state 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.369***
(0.011 ) (0.012) (0.105)
Border state -0.098*** -0.605***
(0.01 7) (0.114)
Age -0.005** -0.005** -0.007
(0.002) (0.002) (0.016)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education -0.002 -0.002 -0.015
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010)
Children -0.002 -0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.01 7)
Manied 0.004 0.005 -0.045
(0.011 ) (0.011) (0.074)
Manied*Spouse Employed 0.002 0.001 0.047
(0.011 ) (0.011) (0.075)
Skilled worker -0.008 -0.008 -0.01 I
(0.013) (0.013) (0.075)
Agricultural worker 0.080*** 0.083*** 0.387***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.082)
Migrant's prevo mos. in US 0.218** 0.213** 2.331 ***
(0.091 ) (0.091 ) (0.616)
Community-Level Variables
Migration Exp to US 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.078***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.018)
Population -0.070*** -0.072*** -0.480***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.161)
Fema]eLFPR 0.492*** 0.223 2.988***
(0.130) (0.]54) (0.882)
% of adults wi educ. > 6 yrs 0.179** 0.362*** 1.014**
(0.075) (0.107) (0.479)
% of adults wi 2X min. wage -0.008 -0.027 -0.640
(0.077) (0.094) (0.558)
US Unemp. Rate 0.349 0.161 0.956
(0.597) (0.600) (5.382)
MX Unemp. Rate 0.495 0.442 3.830
(0.404) (0.405) (3.573)
Linewatch Hours (t-!) 0.030 0.022 0.251
(0.031) (0.031 ) (0.273)
Exchange Rate 0.005 0.005 0.049
(0.006) (0.006) (0.052)
Year -0.008* -0.007 -0.040
(0.004) (0.004) (0.039)
Min. distance to border 0.198*** 0.931 ***
(0.031) (0.192)
State-specific dummies NO YES NO
Constant 15.565* 13.290 72.937
(8.339) (8.396) (74.859)
Obs. 10505 10505 10505
Log-L -665.413 -657.303 -2542.883
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.lO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.OI
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Table 11. Linear Probability Models of Migration: Aggregate FDI flows, 1982 - 2004.
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI flow to Mexico 0.030 -0.102 -0.435 0.014 -0.108 -0.485
(0.116) (0.410) (0.414) (0.116) (0.410) (0.414)
(FDI flow to Mexico)2 0.338 0.312
(1.004) (1.004)
NAFTA*FDI flow to MX 0.476 0.511
(0.406) (0.407)
NAFTA -0.002 0.003 -0.027 -0.000 0.005 -0.027
(0.015) (0.021) (0.026) (0.015) (0.021) (0.026)
Age 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001)
Children -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001)
Married 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Married*Spouse Employed 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Skilled worker -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (OmO) (0.010)
Agricultural worker 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.Ql5 0.Ql5 oms
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Migrant's prevo mos. in US 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.479*** 0.479*** 0.479***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Community-Level variables
Migration Exp to US 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001 )
Population 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Female LFPR -0.001 -0.001 -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.017
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
% of adults wi educ. > 6 yrs -0.048 -0.048 -0.044 -0.000 -0.000 0.005
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
% of adults wi 2X min. wage -0.082** -0.082** -0.085*** -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.139***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
US Unemp. Rate -0.791 *** -0.760*** -0.647*** -0.763*** -0.734*** -0.608***
(0.153) (0.179) (0.197) (0.154) (0.179) (0.197)
MX Unemp. Rate 0.027 0.000 -0.024 0.038 0.013 -0.016
(0.163) (0.181) (0.168) (0.163) (0.181) (0.168)
Linewatch Hours (t-I) 0.011 0.012 0.003 0.Ql5 0.Ql5 0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Exchange Rate -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Year 0.002* 0.003* 0.004** 0.003** 0.004** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Min. distance to border -0.036** -0.036** -0.036**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Border state -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
State-specific dummies NO NO NO YES YES YES
Constant -4.886* -5.447* -7.504** -7.009** -7.525** -9.815***
(2.762) (3.226) (3.554) (2.817) (3.272) (3.595)
Obs. 44006 44006 44006 44006 44006 44006
Log-L -7278.220 -7278.164 -7277.536 -7242.128 -7242.080 -7241.338
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.IO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.OI
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Table 12. Linear Probability Models of Migration: Aggregate FDI flows, 1994 - 2004.
(I) (2) (3) (4)
FDI flow to Mexico 0.109 1.781** 0.094 1.459
(0.154) (0.901) (0.154) (0.902)
(FDI flow to Mexico/ -3.960* -3.234
(2.103) (2.104)
Age 0.019 0.021
(0.025) (0.025)
Age2 -0.021 -0.021
(0.014) (0.014)
Education -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Married -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001 ) (0.001 )
Married*Spouse Employed 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Skilled worker 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011 ) (0.011)
Agricultural worker 0.004 0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.011) (O.QlI) (0.011 ) (0.011)
Migrant's prevo mos. in US 0.041 *** 0.040*** 0.029** 0.029**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Community-Level Variables
Migration Exp to US -0.010 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Population 0.496 1.164** 0.455 1.001 *
(0.379) (0.519) (0.379) (0.519)
Female LFPR 0.001 -O.QlI 0.007 -0.003
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
% of adults wi educ. > 6 yrs -0.032* -0.031 -0.043** -0.042**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.Q21) (0.021)
% of adults wi 2X min. wage 0.028 0.032 -0.279*** -0.272***
(0.074) (0.074) (0.101) (0.101)
US Unemp. Rate 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
MX Unemp. Rate 0.429*** 0.429*** 0.434*** 0.433***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.Q70) (0.070)
Linewatch Hours (t-I) -2.408** -2.405** -2.249** -2.248**
(0.977) (0.976) (0.977) (0.977)
Exchange Rate 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.422*** 0.420***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.105) (0.105)
Year -0.184*** -0.189*** 0.033 0.026
(0.059) (0.059) (0.093) (0.093)
Min. distance to border -0.004 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008)
Border state 0.004 0.001
(0.011) (O.QlI)
State-specific dummies NO NO YES YES
Constant -6.760 -2.188 -5.233 -1.601
(21.125) (21.262) (21.236) (21.365)
Obs. 9837.000 9837.000 9837.000 9837.000
Log-L -1663.491 -1661.718 -1612.677 -1611.496
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.IO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.O
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Table 13. Linear Probability Models of Migration: State-level FDI flows, 1994 - 2004.
(I) (2) (3) (4)
FOI flow 0.007 -0.107*** 0.009 -0.083**
(0.012) (0.032) (0.013) (0.035)
(FOI flow) 2 0.048*** 0.038***
(0.013) (0.013)
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001 ) (0.001) (0.001)
Children 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Married*Spouse Employed 0.002 0.003 -0.006 -0.006
(0.011) (0.011 ) (0.011) (0.011 )
Skilled worker -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Agricultural worker 0.041 *** 0.042*** 0.029** 0.030**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Migrant's prevo mos. in US 0.436*** 0.440*** 0.440*** 0.440***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.070) (0.070)
Community-Level Variables
Migration Exp to US 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Population -0.032* -0.028 -0.041 * -0.041 *
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Female LFPR 0.024 0.039 -0.301 *** -0.308***
(0.075) (0.075) (0.103) (0.103)
% of adults wi educ. > 6 yrs 0.271 *** 0.227*** -0.433*** 0.429***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.106) (0.106)
% of adults wi 2X min. wage -0.196*** -0.165*** 0.039 0.054
(0.060) (0.061) (0.095) (0.095)
US Unemp. Rate -2.413** -2.879*** -2.215** -2.592***
(0.988) (0.995) (0.998) (1.006)
MX Unemp. Rate 0.537 0.656* 0.483 0.585
(0.379) (0.380) (0.380) (0.381)
Linewatch Hours (t-I) 0.000 0.030 0.004 0.033
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Exchange Rate -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Year 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Min. distance to border 0.018 -0.007
(0.025) (0.026)
Borderstate -0.027* 0.010
(0.016) (0.019)
State-specific dummies NO NO YES YES
Constant -12.080 -7.294 -9.772 -4.350
(19.806) (19.836) (19.883) (19.964)
Obs. 9589 9589 9589 9589
Log-L -1594.893 -1587.493 -1543.748 -1539.581
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.IO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.OI
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Table 14. Linear Probability Models of Migration: State-Level FDI flows, 1994 - 2004, Border States.
(I) (2) (3) (4)
FDI flow 0.025 -0.164*** 0.025 -0.165***
(0.017) (0.061) (0.017) (0.061 )
(FDI flow)2 0.066*** 0.066***
(0.020) (0.021)
Age -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Married*Spouse Employed 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Skilled worker 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Agricultural worker 0.030* 0.030* 0.030* 0.030*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Migrant's prevo mos. in US -0.095 -0.093 -0.095 -0.093
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Community-Level Variables
Migration Exp to US 0.011** 0.010* 0.009 0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Population -0.076 -0.058 -0.087 -0.057
(0.055) (0.055) (0.061) (0.061)
Female LFPR -0.143 -0.222 -0.034 -0.239
(0.216) (0.217) (0.337) (0.343)
% of adults wI educ. > 6 yrs 0.578* 0.524 0.610* 0.519
(0.331 ) (0.332) (0.340) (0.341 )
% of adults wI 2X min. wage -0.339** -0.303* -0.402* -0.294
(0.163) (0.163) (0.222) (0.224)
US Unemp. Rate -0.217 -0.967 -0.344 -0.950
(4.036) (4.033) (4.048) (4.042)
MX Unemp. Rate 1.160 1.476* 1.136 1.480*
(0.780) (0.784) (0.782) (0.788)
Linewatch Hours (t-l) -0.008 0.075 -0.016 0.077
(0.102) (0.105) (0.104) (0.108)
Exchange Rate -0.010 -0.005 -0.009 -0.005
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Year 0.021 0.009 0.022 0.009
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021 ) (0.022)
Min. distance to border -0.425 -0.324
(0.276) (0.277)
State-specific dummies NO NO YES YES
Constant -40.299 -19.349 -43.067 -19.161
(40.493) (40.907) (40.924) (41.495)
Obs. 2674 2674 2674 2674
Log-L -115.767 -110.545 -115.680 -110.543
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.IO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.O I
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Table 15. Linear Probability Models of Migration: State-Level FDI flows, 1994 - 2004, interior states only.
(I) (2) (3) (4)
FDI flow -0.033 -0.174** -0.017 -0.048
(0.024) (0.074) (0.024) (0.081 )
(FDI flow)2 0.105** 0.023
(0.052) (0.056)
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Manied 0.014 Om5 0.014 0.014
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Manied*Spouse Employed -0.007 -0.007 -om 8 -om 8
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Skilled worker -om 8 -0.017 -0.013 -0.013
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Agricultural worker 0.040*** 0.041 *** 0.024 0.024
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Migrant's prevo mos. in US 0.681 *** 0.684*** 0.695*** 0.695***
(0.100) (0.099) (0.096) (0.096)
Community-Level Variables
Migration Exp to US 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Population -0.023 -0.022 -0.031 -0.Q31
(0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029)
Female LFPR -0.053 -0.077 -0.561 *** -0.563***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.131) (0.131)
% of adults wi educ. > 6 yrs 0.295*** 0.264*** 0.412*** 0.410***
(0.093) (0.094) (0.122) (0.122)
% of adults wi 2X min. wage -0.128 -0.064 0.373*** 0.378***
(0.111) (0.115) (0.141) (0.142)
US Unemp. Rate -2.582** -2.809** -2.589** -2.637**
(1.117) (1.122) (1.117) (1.124)
MX Unemp. Rate 0.254 0.298 0.101 0.113
(0.454) (0.454) (0.454) (0.455)
Linewatch Hours (t-I) 0.013 0.020 0.007 0.010
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063)
Exchange Rate -0.005 -0.007 -0.003 -0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Year 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Min. distance to border -0.006 -0.023
(0.029) (0.030)
State-specific dummies NO NO YES YES
Constant -6.091 -9.375 -1.662 -2.102
(23.168) (23.225) (23.218) (23.243)
Obs. 6915 6915 6915 6915
Log-L -1358.000 -1355.946 -1307.062 -1306.979
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.IO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.O
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Table 16. - Panel A. Multinomial Logit Model of Migration using FDI flows, all states, 1994 - 2004.
All States All States - State FE
Job change US Migration Job change US Migration
(I) (2) (3) (4)
FDI flow 0.204 -2.341 *** 0.491 -1.567***
(0.374) (0.381 ) (0.450) (0.334)
(FDI flowi -0.086 0.875*** -0.183 0.557***
(0.152) (0.151) (0.172) (0.135)
Age -0.087*** 0.001 -0.087*** -0.003
(0.016) (0.028) (0.016) (0.027)
Age2 0.000** -0.001 *** 0.000** -0.001 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education -0.023* -0.005 -0.022* -0.006
(0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017)
Children 0.014 0.019 0.011 0.016
(0.021) (0.032) (0.021) (0.032)
Married -0.184* -0.267** -0.186* -0.258**
(0.106) (0.120) (0.107) (0.121)
Married*Spouse Employed 0.135 0.196 0.122 0.172
(0.103) (0.120) (0.102) (0.120)
Skilled worker -0.130 -0.030 -0.131 -0.027
(0.091 ) (0.106) (0.091 ) (0.107)
Agricultural worker -0.361 *** -0.261 ** -0.387*** -0.301 **
(0.110) (0.130) (0.111) (0.131)
Migrant's prevo mos. in US 6.628*** 17.822*** 6.672*** 17.902***
(0.706) (0.966) (0.701) (0.967)
Community-Level Variables
Migration Exp to US -0.048** 0.084*** -0.041 * 0.091 ***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
Population -0.501 *** 0.127 -0.406** 0.288
(0.168) (0.210) (0.183) (0.260)
Female LFPR -0.029 -2.964*** -0.358 -3.029***
(0.681 ) (0.737) (0.989) (1.074)
% of adults wi educ. > 6 yrs 0.349 0.621 -0.387 -0.312
(0.654) (0.864) (0.955) (1.342)
% of adults wi 2X min. wage -0.255 -0.209 0.422 0.290
(0.526) (0.652) (0.903) (1.051)
US Unemp. Rate -21.056* -29.374*** -18.602 -26.563***
(11.936) (8.679) (12.170) (8.759)
MX Unemp. Rate -2.479 6.670** -3.207 4.662*
(4.545) (2.654) (4.593) (2.611)
Linewatch Hours (t-I) -1.186* 0.942** -1.268* 0.664
(0.638) (0.433) (0.667) (0.438)
Exchange Rate -0.016 -0.107** -0.007 -0.088*
(0.081) (0.048) (0.082) (0.048)
Year 0.228* -0.023 0.239* 0.008
(0.125) (0.079) (0.129) (0.081 )
Min. distance to border 0.273 -0.902***
(0.245) (0.261)
Border state -0.036 1.006***
(0.183) (0.217)
Constant -435.112* 35.232 -455.981 * -21.111
(240.711) (151.129) (246.563) (155.236)
Obs. 12130 12130
Log-L -7943.777 -7899.400
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.IO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.OI. Base category is ''No Job Change, No Migration".
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Table 16. - Panel B. Multinomial Logit Model of Migration using FDI flows, border states, 1994 - 2004.
Border States Border States - State FE
Job change US Migration Job change US Migration
(I) (2) (3) (4)
FDI flow 1.849** -1.786*** 2.125*** -1.504***
(0.824) (0.508) (0.822) (0.521)
(FDI flow)' -0.641 ** 0.689*** -0.736*** 0.591 ***
(0.274) (0.188) (0.277) (0.196)
Age -0.105*** -0.049 -0.108*** -0.051
(0.030) (0.053) (0.031) (0.053)
Age2 0.001 * -0.001 0.001 * -0.001
(0.000) (0.001 ) (0.000) (0.001 )
Education -0.020 0.032 -0.022 0.031
(0.023) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028)
Children 0.006 -0.097 0.003 -0.098
(0.043) (0.076) (0.043) (0.076)
Married -0.338* -0.120 -0.338* -0.122
(0.189) (0.229) (0.190) (0.230)
Married*Spouse Employed 0.219 0.459* 0.223 0.464*
(0.225) (0.244) (0.223) (0.245)
Skilled worker -0.082 0.321 * -0.076 0.328*
(0.171) (0.194) (0.171) (0.194)
Agricultural worker -0.241 0.469* -0.241 0.468*
(0.233) (0.268) (0.235) (0.269)
Migrant's prevo mos. in US 6.609*** 16.069*** 6.598*** 16.032***
(1.200) (1.681 ) (1.197) (1.680)
Community-Level Variables
Migration Exp to US -0.000 0.222** -0.126 0.148
(0.080) (0.095) (0.103) (0.123)
Population -2.226*** 0.229 -3.297*** -0.175
(0.788) (0.816) (0.878) (0.775)
Female LFPR 2.172 -1.627 11.530** 3.176
(3.146) (3.608) (4.826) (3.839)
% of adults wi educ. > 6 yrs 11.009** -1.263 14.649*** -0.294
(4.900) (5.317) (5.106) (5.263)
% of adults wi 2X min. wage -4.382* -0.557 -10.003*** -3.238
(2.571 ) (2.882) (3.383) (2.801 )
US Unemp. Rate -40.264 -8.648 -52.197 -13.795
(52.054) (30.033) (52.859) (29.879)
MX Unemp. Rate -0.164 13.545** -1.287 11.576**
(10.018) (5.284) (10.003) (5.327)
Linewatch Hours (t-I) -3.681 *** 0.499 -4.537*** -0.127
(1.296) (1.016) (1.362) (1.027)
Exchange Rate -0.253 -0.063 -0.254 -0.052
(0.204) (0.106) (0.206) (0.105)
Year 0.715*** 0.074 0.849*** 0.165
(0.274) (0.177) (0.285) (0.184)
Min. distance to border -7.790* -1.717
(4.542) (4.597)
Constant -1366.547*** -150.527 -1624.369*** -323.606
(528.904) (338.997) (549.406) (353.258)
Obs. 3472 3472
Log-L -2144.749 -2140.912
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.IO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.OI. Base category is ''No Job Change, No Migration".
90
Table 16. - Panel C. Multinomial Logit Model of Migration using FDI flows, interior states, 1994 - 2004.
Interior States Interior States - State FE
Job change US Migration Job change US Migration
(I) (2) (3) (4)
FDI flow -1.1 73 -3.434*** -1.566 -1.947***
(0.800) (0.764) (1.069) (0.668)
(FDI flow)2 1.063* 1.854*** 1.274* 0.886**
(0.593) (0.506) (0.736) (0.440)
Age -0.087*** 0.013 -0.085*** 0.008
(0.018) (0.030) (0.018) (0.030)
Age2 0.000** -0.001 *** 0.000** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education -0.024 -0.024 -0.022 -0.022
(0.015) (0.02 I) (0.015) (0.022)
Children 0.008 0.037 0.004 0.034
(0.025) (0.035) (0.025) (0.035)
Married -0.056 -0.317** -0.075 -0.309**
(0.129) (0.145) (0.131 ) (0.147)
Married*Spouse Employed 0.107 0.124 0.087 0.082
(0.118) (0.138) (0.117) (0.138)
Skilled worker -0.157 -0.151 -0.164 -0.155
(0.107) (0.131) (0.107) (0.133)
Agricultural worker -0.389*** -0.476*** -0.426*** -0.564***
(0.129) (0.151) (0.132) (0.153)
Migrant's prevo mos. in US 6.832*** 18.889*** 6.883*** 18.956***
(0.924) (1.161) (0.916) (1.149)
Community-Level Variables
Migration Exp to US -0.051 ** 0.065** -0.037 0.099***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031)
Population -0.394* 0.261 -0.305 0.425
(0.217) (0.256) (0.230) (0.311)
Female LFPR 0.810 -1.909* -0.455 -4.673***
(0.922) (1.109) (1.139) (1.318)
% of adults wi educ. > 6 yrs -0.426 0.216 -0.985 -0.382
(0.726) (0.967) (0.991) (1.441 )
% of adults wi 2X min. wage -0.875 -0.927 0.595 2.001
(0.908) (1.155) (1.180) (1.406)
US Unemp. Rate -12.579 -30.243*** -13.944 -28.646***
(12.882) (9.147) (12.959) (9.429)
MX Unemp. Rate -4.657 2.517 -4.520 0.374
(5.393) (3.144) (5.455) (3.128)
Linewatch Hours (t-l) -0.955 0.816* -0.696 0.695
(0.762) (0.491 ) (0.800) (0.497)
Exchange Rate 0.047 -0.108* 0.040 -0.075
(0.094) (0.057) (0.096) (0.057)
Year 0.184 0.004 0.158 -0.016
(0.150) (0.091) (0.153) (0.093)
Min. distance to border 0.021 -1.006***
(0.261) (0.272)
Constant -350.164 -17.057 -303.643 24.372
(287.181 ) (174.614) (293.255) (179.075)
Obs. 8658 8658
Log-L -5713.710 -5669.673
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<O.lO, ** p<0.05, *** p<O.OI. Base category is "No Job Change, No Migration"
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FIGURES
Figure 1. Total Annual Line-Watch Hours
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Figure 2. Annual Line-Watch Hours by Sector
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Figure 3. Line-watch Hours per Border Mile by State
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Figure 4. FDI Stock and Flow in Mexico, 1981 - 2006.
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Figure 5. Cumulative FDI Flows (USD) to Mexican States, 1994 - 1999
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Source: Author's calculations based on data described in text. Higher quintiles represented by darker shades.
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